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SUMMARY
The application of higher-order PDA-based flow analyses to object-oriented languages
enables comprehensive and precise characterization of program behavior, while retaining
practicality with efficiency. We implement one such flow analysis which we’ve named
OOCFA2.
While over the years many advancements in flow analysis have been made, they have
almost exclusively been with respect to functional languages, often modeled with the 𝜆-
calculus. Object-oriented semantics—while also able to be modeled in a functional setting—
provide certain structural guarantees and common idioms which we believe are valuable to
reason over in a first-class manner. By tailoring modern, advanced flow analyses to object-
oriented semantics, we believe it is possible to achieve greater precision and efficiency than
could be had using a functional modeling. This, in turn, reflects upon the possible classes
of higher-level analyses using the underlying flow analysis: the more powerful, efficient, and
flexible the flow analysis, the more classes of higher-level analyses—e.g., security analyses—
can be practically expressed.
The growing trend is that smartphone and mobile-device (e.g., tablet) users are
integrating these devices into their lives, in more frequent and more personal ways.
Accordingly, the primary application and proof-of-concept for this work is the analysis of
the Android [11] operating system’s permissions-based security system vis-à-vis potentially
malicious applications. It is implemented atop OOCFA2. The use of a such a powerful
higher-order flow analysis allows one to apply its knowledge to create a wide variety of
powerful and practical security-analysis “front-ends”—not only the permissions-checking
analysis in this work, but also, e.g., information-flow analyses.
To our knowledge, OOCFA2 is the first higher-order flow analysis in an object-oriented
setting. We empirically evaluate its accuracy and performance to prove its practical
viability. We also evaluate the proof-of-concept security analysis’ accuracy as directly
ix
related to OOCFA2; this shows promising results for the potential of building security-






The growing trend is that smartphone and mobile-device (e.g., tablet) users are integrating
these devices into their lives, in more frequent and more personal ways. Thus, users are
exposing and even entrusting more sensitive information to devices that are becoming more
and more omnipresent and laden with various applications, for example bank records, e-
mail passwords, social-network credentials, sensitive files, and the contact list. There is a
large amount of sensitive information available on a modern user’s mobile device. Even
further than the individual users themselves, these devices are also roaming, networked
systems. This means that, for example, business networks can be compromised via a rogue,
trusted device. Alternatively, a public or non-commercial network could be compromised
to propagate the malware or to intercept all other users’ transmissions.
There is a great amount and variety of real-world trouble that can result from mobile-
device security violations. Accordingly, the primary application and proof-of-concept for
this work is the analysis of the Android [11] operating system’s permissions-based security
system vis-à-vis potentially malicious applications.
While over the years many advancements in flow analysis have been made, they have
almost exclusively been with respect to functional languages, often modeled with the 𝜆-
calculus. Object-oriented semantics—while also able to be modeled in a functional setting—
provide certain structural guarantees and common idioms which we believe are valuable to
reason over in a first-class manner. By tailoring modern, advanced flow analyses to object-
oriented semantics, we believe it is possible to achieve greater precision and efficiency than
could be had using a functional modeling. This, in turn, reflects upon the possible classes
of higher-level analyses using the underlying flow analysis: the more powerful, efficient, and
flexible the flow analysis, the more classes of higher-level analyses—e.g., security analyses—
can be practically expressed.
1.2 High-level approach
The algorithm we describe in this work is a flow analysis using abstract interpretation.
Abstract interpretation a static-analysis technique which involves computing a sound
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approximation of the states in which a program may be. In a way, it’s as if one is attempting
to answer the question “what is the result of this program for all inputs?”—effectively
“running” the program for all inputs. As it would be at least intractable and (more likely)
uncomputable to attempt to, e.g., run a program for all integers between 0 and 232, abstract
interpretation instead abstracts those values in some way. For our purposes, we consider
it some unknown integer. (However some other algorithms will use domain-specialized
representations, like the prefix domain for strings.) From this abstraction, it results that
conditional control structures require that the algorithm explore all paths which are possible
according to the set of possible inputs to the conditional. Thus, abstract interpretation ends
up honestly exploring all possible paths through the program.
Of great consequence to the effectiveness of our algorithm is that the more precise an
abstract-analysis algorithm is, the more likely it is that the algorithm will also take less time
to analyze a program. This is because with greater precision there sometimes (depending
on the means of the precision-increase) comes a decreased size in the abstract state space,
and thus a decrease in the number of possible states the algorithm must explore. [18]
We apply this precision and efficiency to great effect on our motivating issue: Android
security. We introduce in this work (chapter 4) a proof-of-concept permission-checking
“front-end” whose precision and efficiency are directly tied to that of our underlying
OOCFA2 algorithm.
1.3 Background: Android
(Unless otherwise noted, all discussion involving Android should be assumed to be referring
to the latest Android version at the time of this writing: 4.1.1.)
Android is currently the world’s most popular smartphone operating system, with a
worldwide market share [27] of 68% at the second quarter of 2012. Furthermore, partly
due to its use of the Linux kernel [17], Android has seen use in many areas outside the
smartphone space, including netbooks, e-book readers, smart TVs, refrigerators, vehicle
navigation systems, and more. Given such broad and personally-vested use, it is a very
high-profile target for security exploitation.
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It is built on the Linux kernel [17] (currently with out-of-tree customizations); a custom
system C library called bionic; a variety of Android-specific middleware, libraries, and
daemons; and a custom Java-running [20] virtual machine known as the Dalvik virtual
machine [14] (DVM), with associated standard libraries based on Apache Harmony [6].
As a result of this composition, Android applications are typically written in C, C++, and
Java, using the appropriate Android APIs and facilities.
In this section we discuss Android’s security-oriented design decisions—in particular its




The Android operating system, development infrastructure, and larger ecosystem were
designed with security in mind. Of course, the term “security” is heavily overloaded,
especially in modern times, thus we refine this notion into Android’s specific goals: [11]
• Protect user data
• Protect system resources (including, e.g., the cellular network)
• Protect application/author data, i.e., DRM (Digital Rights Management)
At a platform/system level, Android provides several high-level security features which
further these goals: [11]
• Extensive use of kernel-provided security, permission, and isolation features
• Mandatory application sandboxing for all applications (e.g., using individual DVMs)
• Secure inter-process communication (IPC) for secure communication between isolated
applications
• Application cryptographic signing
• Application- and system-defined and user-granted permissions
4
Figure 1: Android software stack [23]
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More specifically, Android uses the Linux kernel’s various security features along with
relatively standard userspace solutions to achieve the following security enhancements:
• The system partition—containing the kernel, system libraries, application runtime
and framework, and standard applications—is set to read-only
• Standard UNIX filesystem permissions are enforced; notably with user-differentiated
applications (see below), this very effectively prevents undesired application data
meddling
• Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) support, to prevent code execution on the stack
and heap
• Use of OpenBSD’s “dllmalloc” and “calloc” to protect against common programming
errors and attacks involving heap allocation
• Robust whole filesystem encryption, using dm-crypt
• Position Independent Executable (PIE) support with Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR) to randomize most memory locations
• Read-only relocations with link-time immediate binding (using the linker’s “-z relro”
and “-z now” options)
• Kernel addresses are not exposed in any way, given that “dmesg_restrict” and
“kptr_restrict” are enabled
• Static protection against stack overflows (using gcc’s “-fstack-protector” option)
Of particular note is that the Android system assigns a unique user ID (UID) to each
application and runs it as that user in a separate process. This is in contrast to the
typical operating systems approach of having multiple applications run under the same
user permissions—of the user who runs them. In addition, each Dalvik application runs
in its own dedicated Dalvik virtual machine, ensuring that this process-level and user-level
isolation reaches non-native code. Because the applications are isolated in this way, they can
only communicate under the purview of the kernel, using Android’s provided IPC facilities.
6
1.3.1.2 Permissions
At the user-visible level, Android features an extensive—if ad-hoc—permissions-based
security solution. These permissions are merely atomic predicates such as “the ability
to access the network” or “the ability to modify the contact list”. Notably, they cannot be
combined into simple expressions (beyond simple conjunction) such as “the ability to access
the network OR the ability to modify the contact list”, nor more complex expressions such
as “the ability to send the contact list over the network”. Permissions also lack any notion
of a “permissions lattice” or any other relations between them, such as “the ability to get
a fine-grained location” being a sub-permission or otherwise implying “the ability to get a
coarse-grained location”.
When a user installs an application, she has the opportunity to review the permissions it
requests. They can then make an informed choice of whether or not to install the application
and thus grant it all such permissions; they cannot, however, grant or deny individual
permissions. Combined with the deficiencies in the expressiveness of the permissions system,
this means that a user must accept an application as requiring “the ability to send over the
network” and “the ability to read the contact list” and simply trust that the application does
not perform the higher-level, undesirable action of “reading the contact list and sending it
over the network”.
Permission checks are typically performed at Android API boundaries, where the API
implementation performs the check in a system process. Therefore, not only are the
permissions themselves ad-hoc and non-relational, the nature of the permissions checks
is also ad-hoc. That is to say, permissions are checked in ad-hoc places throughout the
Android APIs, with ad-hoc rules about re-checking. In particular, API library shims may
perform the required permission-checking, but do so redundantly with the implementation,
as an application could directly communicate with the underlying implementation by, e.g.,
communicating with the system process via an RPC stub. [9]
Some permissions are implemented not through Android’s internal permission-validation
mechanisms, but rather through the previously discussed use of standard Unix groups
permissions. Notably, an application installed with the INTERNET , BLUETOOTH , or
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WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permissions is assigned to a predefined Linux group which may
access the relevant sockets and files related to those permissions.
Though Android allows (and in many situations, encourages) applications to include
native code as well as DVM code, native code is still beholden to the permissions system.
Permissions enforced via non-API means, such as the Unix permissions model, are still in
effect for native code. Also, native code cannot directly interact with the system API; the
application must create DVM wrappers to interact with the system APIs on behalf of the
native code. In this manner, permissions-checking can focus on the Java-facing APIs.
In the context of this proof-of-concept application, we only target Android’s permissions-
based security system for analysis. I provide the following validation for this choice:
• It is a relatively contained and well-defined security system.
• It is the most user-facing security system.
• It is the most commonly exploited security system; not (necessarily) in terms
of circumvention, but rather abusing the coarse, inexpressive permissions system,
combined with user ignorance.
1.3.2 Challenges
The security and trustworthiness of applications deployed on mobile devices are both
increasing important and difficult qualities to ensure. They carry sensitive data and have
capabilities with significant social and financial effect. Yet, while it is paramount that
such software is trustworthy, these applications pose challenges beyond the reach of current
practice for low-cost, high-assurance verification and analysis. The domain is complex,
involving interacting, event-driven programs; intricate security models; code from untrusted
sources; highly sensitive data; and multiple channels on which data may be leaked.
Malicious agents are doing more and more to subvert and exploit these devices. Initially,
this consisted of misusing permissions as granted by the Android security system, such as
combining the ability to read the user’s contact list with the ability to send over the network
to thus send the user’s contact list to a malicious third party. Nowadays, even the basic
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permissions system as provided by Android is being circumvented in order to enact a whole
array of new, undesirable behavior.
Typical approaches to combating malware, such as Google’s Bouncer tool, involve
cataloging known exploits and search codebases for patterns of misbehavior. This leads
to an arms race between those exploiting the mobile environment and those fortifying it.
We develop an alternative approach based on semantics-based program analysis that aims
to bypass this race by giving a precise, sound, static characterization of mobile application
behavior.
1.4 Contributions
This is the first PDA-based higher-order flow analysis in an object-oriented setting. With
respect to the modeling of the Dalvik virtual machine, this is the first application of a
higher-order flow analysis to an assembly language. We discuss the algorithm in chapter 3
and in particular our novel extensions to flow-analysis in section 3.3.
This work also features the first (published) formal model of the Dalvik virtual machine
and its semantics. As far as we are aware, it is also most definitely the first formal
model targeting Dalvik’s ROP (cf. sections 2.1 and 2.2). We discuss this model—named
Welterweight Dalvik—in section 2.3.
The Android-security-focused proof-of-concept application also is the first (published
example) of its kind. We discuss this application in chapter 4. The use of such a powerful
higher-order flow analysis allows one to apply its knowledge to create a wide variety of
powerful and practical security-analysis “front-ends”—not only the permissions-checking





The Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) is the primary and preferred means of running
applications in the Android environment. It is a register-based, per-process virtual machine,
thus emphasizing extreme application isolation and sandboxing to the point that every
process runs in its own virtual machine instance.
In section 2.1 we discuss the DVM, the Dalvik toolchain, and where OOCFA2 fits in that
toolchain. In section 2.2 we present the Dalvik ROP, which is the abstracted instruction-set
for the DVM over which our algorithm reasons. We also present and discuss a formal model
of the DVM and its runtime in section 2.3. Note that we assume of the reader a basic
understanding of compilers and a very basic notion of operational semantics.
2.1 Dalvik Toolchain
The Android compilation toolchain is given in Figure 2. A Java compiler (noted in the figure
as javac) takes the Android application’s Java source, the Android libraries, and any other
external Java libraries, and compiles and links them together to produce Java compiled
class files. The dx tool is used to convert from Java compiled class files (whose instructions
are JVM bytecode [19]) to Dalvik’s dex bytecode format [5] (whose instructions are DOP
[4]). The conversion process entails a simple “simulation” of a JVM execution of the JVM
bytecode. It first converts from JVM bytecode to an intermediate representation, ROP.
This is essentially a polymorphic and abstracted view of DOP. Most importantly, at this
phase methods are internally represented as interconnected basic blocks. If optimization
is enabled, dx then translates the ROP into an SSA (Static Single Assignment) form,
upon which some simple optimizations are performed, and then back into normal ROP.
From there, dx lowers from ROP to DOP, performs string and constant deduplication,
and proceeds to pack all the resulting DOP, class information, etc. into the final dex file.
Notably, the dx tool is the only officially-supported method of generating DOP, and is thus
an integral part of the Android toolchain, making it the optimal target for extension.
2.1.1 OOCFA2 in the toolchain
OOCFA2 is integrated into the dx tool, thereby inserting itself as part of the Android























Figure 2: The Android compilation toolchain, through dx, including OOCFA2 additions
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notably it does so simply to take advantage of ROP’s polymorphism and relative abstraction;
it would not be too difficult to have it operate upon DOP directly as part of future work.
(Of note, this would allow OOCFA2 to reason over final dex files, possibly having been
created or manipulated by hand or using external tools.)
The analysis passively collects the ROP forms of the entire compilation unit, then
analyzes them and only afterward allows dx to continue and compile and output DOP.
In this way, OOCFA2 and analyses using it can influence the intermediate ROP or prevent
the creation of DOP altogether, depending on what the analyses conclude.
2.2 Dalvik ROP
The Dalvik ROP consists of instructions using the following opcodes:
• NOP is simply a no-op.
• MOVE copies a value from one register to another.
• MOVE-PARAM moves the next of a method’s arguments into the given register.
• MOVE-RESULT moves the result of a method invocation into the given register. It may
only be used following a method invocation.
• MOVE-RESULT-PSEUDO is the same as MOVE-RESULT, except that it must be used as the
first instruction of a block following a non-invoke throwing instruction.
• MOVE-EXCEPTION moves a caught exception into the given register. It may only be
used at the start of an exception handler.
• CONST moves the given constant value into the given register.
• GOTO jumps to the given label.
• IF-EQ tests the equality of two arguments and if they are equal jumps to the specified
label. The arguments must both be integers or both be object (including arrays)
addresses.
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• IF-NE tests the inequality of two arguments and if they are not equal jumps to the
specified label. The same rule as with IF-EQ applies.
• IF-LT tests whether one integer is less than the other and if so jumps to the specified
label.
• IF-GE tests whether one integer is greater than or equal to the other and if so jumps
to the specified label.
• IF-LE tests whether one integer is less than or equal to the other and if so jumps to
the specified label.
• IF-GT tests whether one integer is greater than the other and if so jumps to the
specified label.
• SWITCH indexes into the given jump-table to jump to a particular label.
• ADD adds two numbers.
• SUB subtracts two numbers.
• MUL multiplies two numbers.
• DIV divides two numbers.
• REM finds the remainder of the division of two numbers.
• NEG negates the given number.
• AND performs a bitwise-and on two integral numbers.
• OR performs a bitwise-or on two integral numbers.
• XOR performs a bitwise-exclusive-or on two integral numbers.
• SHL performs a bitwise-left-shift on two integral numbers.
• SHR performs a signed bitwise-right-shift on two integral numbers.
• USHR performs an unsigned bitwise-right-shift on two integral numbers.
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• NOT performs a bitwise-negation of the given integral number.
• CMPL performs a Java-style “cmpl” on two numbers. This means that the result is 0
if both numbers are equal, 1 if the right is greater than the left, and -1 if the left is
greater than the right. NaN is considered “less-than” all other values.
• CMPG performs a Java-tyle “cmpg” on two numbers. This is the same as with CMPL,
except that NaN is considered “greater-than” all other values.
• CONV converts a number into one of the DVM’s “real” numeric types: int, long, float,
or double. The result is placed in the same register as the argument, effectively doing
an in-place conversion. Which conversion is performed depends on the type of the
result value.
• TO-BYTE converts the given integer into a byte (though the DVM stores it as a full-
length integer) using a Java-style int-to-byte conversion. In pseudocode this would be
(𝑖 << 24) >> 24.
• TO-CHAR is the same as TO-BYTE except that it uses a Java-style int-to-char conversion.
In pseudocode this would be 𝑖 & 𝟶𝚡𝚏𝚏𝚏𝚏.
• TO-SHORT is the same as TO-BYTE except that it uses a Java-style int-to-short
conversion. In pseudocode this would be (𝑖 << 16) >> 16.
• RETURN returns a value from a method, or nothing if the method’s return-type is void.
• THROW throws the given exception in a method.
• MONITOR-ENTER enters the synchronization monitor for the given object.
• MONITOR-EXIT exits the synchronization monitor for the given object.
• CHECK-CAST checks whether the given object is an instance of the given reference-type
specification; if not, then the DVM throws a ClassCastException.
• INSTANCE-OF also checks whether the given object is an instance of the given reference-
type specification, results in an int 1 if true or an int 0 if false.
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• NEW-INSTANCE allocates heap space for an object of the given class specification, in
which it results.
• NEW-ARRAY allocates heap space for an array of the given element type specification
and size, in which it results.
• FILLED-NEW-ARRAY is the same as NEW-ARRAY, though it initializes the given indices
in the array with given values.
• FILL-ARRAY-DATA supplements FILLED-NEW-ARRAY with the data it is to use to fill
the array.
• ARRAY-LENGTH results in the length of the given array.
• AGET gets the element at the given index in the given array.
• APUT puts the given value into the given index in the given array.
• GET-FIELD gets the instance field—according to the given instance field specification—
of the given object.
• GET-STATIC gets the static field—according to the given static field specification.
• PUT-FIELD assigns the instance field—according to the given instance field specification—
of the given object to the given value.
• PUT-STATIC assigns the static field—according to the given static field specification—
to the given value.
• INVOKE-STATIC calls the static method—according to the given static method
specification—with the given arguments.
• INVOKE-VIRTUAL calls the instance method—according to the given instance method
specification and dispatched according to the given object—with the given arguments
(and the given object prepended).
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• INVOKE-SUPER is the same as INVOKE-VIRTUAL, but uses the given object’s superclass
for dispatch.
• INVOKE-DIRECT is the same as INVOKE-VIRTUAL, but calls a direct or special method.
• INVOKE-INTERFACE is the same as INVOKE-VIRTUAL, but uses an interface instance
method specification.
• MARK-LOCAL is simply for a debugger’s use; it marks the name of a local variable.
2.3 Welterweight Dalvik: Formal Model of DVM/ROP
In this section, we describe our formal model of the DVM given ROP: Welterweight
Dalvik. We give the grammar of the language’s syntax in Figure 3, define our formal
conceptualization of the ROP instructions in Figure 4, and the semantic domains of our
abstract machine model in Figure 5. The reduction rules for the abstract machine are
presented in subsection 2.3.2, interspersed with prose presenting them.
Welterweight Dalvik was developed using Redex: a domain-specific language for
specifying reduction semantics, plus a suite of tools for working with the semantics. [10] A
formal model of OOCFA2 was likewise developed, but as it currently has a soundness issue,
we have excluded it from this work. We have tested and compared both models using a small
suite of custom-made programs (written in the Welterweight Dalvik grammar) designed to
stress particular aspects of the semantics and OOCFA2 algorithm.
Welterweight Dalvik is valuable because Dalvik was not designed with a formal semantics
in mind and thus it is impossible to prove various properties of the system. Likewise, our
formal model of OOCFA2 is essential to prove various properties—most importantly among
them, soundness—and especially vis-à-vis the concrete semantics.
2.3.1 Grammar
We define the grammar of the language’s syntax in Figure 3.
The top level of a program is given by 𝑇𝑜𝑝-𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 and is simply a nonempty list of class
definitions followed by the identification of which static method should be considered the
“main” function.
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𝑇𝑜𝑝-𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ⩴ [𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 …+ (𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚗 𝐹𝑄-𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)]
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 ⩴ (𝚌𝚕𝚊𝚜𝚜 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐




𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟 ⩴ 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 ∣ ⊤
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⩴ 𝚙𝚞𝚋𝚕𝚒𝚌 ∣ 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚝𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚎𝚍 ∣ 𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚟𝚊𝚝𝚎
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟 ⩴ 𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 ∣ 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕
𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⩴ (𝚏𝚒𝚎𝚕𝚍 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟 … ]
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑡)
𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 ⩴ (𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚑𝚘𝚍 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐
𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟 … ]
[𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 … ] 𝑅𝑒𝑡-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 …+)
𝑅𝑒𝑡-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ⩴ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∣ 𝚟𝚘𝚒𝚍
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ⩴ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∣ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ⩴ 𝚒𝚗𝚝
𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ⩴ 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 ∣ 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ⩴ (𝙰 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 ⩴ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 conforming to Java identifier naming
𝐹𝑄-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 ⩴ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 conforming to Java fully-qualified-identifier naming
𝑙𝑖𝑡 ⩴ 𝑖 ∣ 𝑜 ∣ 𝑎 ∣ 𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕
𝑖 ⩴ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝑜 ⩴ (𝚘𝚋𝚓 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠)
𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 = (𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝑣)
𝑣 ⩴ 𝑖 ∣ 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∣ 𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕
𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⩴ (𝚊𝚍𝚍𝚛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟)
𝑎 ⩴ (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠) given ∄𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 ∣ 𝑖 ≥ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ⩴ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟 given 0 ≤ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟 < 256
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 = (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 → 𝑣)
𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 ⩴ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∣ (𝚕𝚊𝚋𝚎𝚕 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙) ∣ 𝑇𝐶𝐹 ∣ 𝚑𝚊𝚕𝚝
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 ⩴ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑇𝐶𝐹 ⩴ ( 𝚝𝚛𝚢 [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 …+]
𝚌𝚊𝚝𝚌𝚑 [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 … ]
𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕𝚕𝚢 [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 … ])
Figure 3: Grammar of Welterweight Dalvik
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A 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 is a syntactic definition of a Java class, complete with its specification
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐, visibility 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, attributes 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟…, superclass 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟, fields [𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 … ], and
methods [𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 … ].
A 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 is a syntactic definition of a Java field, complete with its specification 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐,
its visibility and attributes as before, its type 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, and its initial (default) value 𝑙𝑖𝑡.
A 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑is a syntactic definition of a Java method, complete with its specficiation
𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐, its visibility and attributes as before, its formal parameter types [𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 … ],
its return type 𝑅𝑒𝑡-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, and its body 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 …+.
A return type may be any 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 or 𝚟𝚘𝚒𝚍. A 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 is either a primitive type 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
or a reference type 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒. The only primitive type in Welterweight Dalvik is 𝚒𝚗𝚝. A
𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 is either denoted by a full class specification 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐, or is an array type
𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒. An 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, in turn, is simply a syntactically distinguished embedding of
the element 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 of the array.
Specifications are listed in the grammar under the syntactic template 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐. They are
simply strings which follow the identifier-naming rules of Java. A full specification is denoted
by the convention of prefixing a specification with 𝙵𝚀- in the grammar. It is a string which
simply describes a dot-separated path of specifications, where all but the last specification
must be 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐s.
Literals are given by 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and are either integers (𝑖), objects (𝑜), arrays (𝑎), or the null
pointer 𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕. An 𝑜 is a syntactic definition of an object, complete with the specification of its
class (𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) and its instance fields (𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠). 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 is a map from 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 to
values 𝑣. In turn, 𝑣s represent run-time, user-accessible values, which are either 𝑖s, addresses
(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), or 𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕. An 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 is simply a syntactically distinguished integer representing a heap
address. An 𝑎 is a syntactic definition of an array, complete with the type of its elements
(𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒), its size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), and its elements (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠), where each element index is within the
array’s size. A 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is simply a bounded integer. 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 is a map from indices (given by
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 to imply the bound) to the elements themselves: 𝑣s.
In particular, literal objects and arrays are really only user-accessible as a convenient
means of denoting complex initial state in a program; as we shall see, when loaded into
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the machine model, they are indirected and replaced with 𝑣s denoting their address in the
initial program heap.
A 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 is either an instruction (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), a label definition, a try-catch-finally block
(𝑇𝐶𝐹 ), or the special halt instruction 𝚑𝚊𝚕𝚝. A 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 is simply a string used to identify
a method-local label. A 𝑇𝐶𝐹 is a try-catch-finally block where the set of instructions
composing each part of the block is given by a [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 … ]. The 𝚝𝚛𝚢 portion of a 𝑇𝐶𝐹
cannot be empty, though the other parts can be.
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𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⩴ (𝚗𝚘𝚙)




∣ (𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚝 𝑟 𝑖)
∣ (𝚐𝚘𝚝𝚘 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙)
∣ (𝐼𝑓 𝑟 𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙)
∣ (𝑂𝑝2 𝑟 𝑟 𝑟)
∣ (𝑂𝑝1 𝑟 𝑟)





∣ (𝚗𝚎𝚠-𝚒𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎 𝑟 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
∣ (𝚗𝚎𝚠-𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑟)
∣ (𝚌𝚑𝚎𝚌𝚔-𝚌𝚊𝚜𝚝 𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)
∣ (𝚒𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎-𝚘𝚏 𝑟 𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)
∣ (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢-𝚕𝚎𝚗 𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)
∣ (𝚊𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟 𝑟 𝑟)
∣ (𝚊𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟 𝑟 𝑟)
∣ (𝚒𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟 𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
∣ (𝚒𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟 𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
∣ (𝚜𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
∣ (𝚜𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
∣ (𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚟𝚒𝚛𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚕 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟 𝑟 … )
∣ (𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚜𝚞𝚙𝚎𝚛 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟 𝑟 … )
∣ (𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟 … )
𝐼𝑓 ⩴ 𝚒𝚏-𝚎𝚚 ∣ 𝚒𝚏-𝚗𝚎 ∣ 𝚒𝚏-𝚐𝚎 ∣ 𝚒𝚏-𝚕𝚎 ∣ 𝚒𝚏-𝚐𝚝
𝑂𝑝2 ⩴ 𝚊𝚍𝚍 ∣ 𝚜𝚞𝚋 ∣ 𝚖𝚞𝚕 ∣ 𝚍𝚒𝚟 ∣ 𝚛𝚎𝚖
∣ 𝚊𝚗𝚍 ∣ 𝚘𝚛 ∣ 𝚡𝚘𝚛 ∣ 𝚜𝚑𝚕 ∣ 𝚜𝚑𝚛 ∣ 𝚞𝚜𝚑𝚛
𝑂𝑝1 ⩴ 𝚗𝚎𝚐 ∣ 𝚗𝚘𝚝
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⩴ 𝚝𝚘-𝚋𝚢𝚝𝚎 ∣ 𝚝𝚘-𝚌𝚑𝚊𝚛 ∣ 𝚝𝚘-𝚜𝚑𝚘𝚛𝚝
𝑟 ⩴ register variable with $-prefix
Figure 4: Instructions in Welterweight Dalvik
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We define our grammar of the ROP instructions in Figure 4.
We will not discuss every instruction individually, as they largely reflect the actual DVM
ROP opcodes and as the reduction rules (subsection 2.3.2) should give clear definitions of
the instructions. However, we will highlight some of the choices made in reducing DVM
ROP into Welterweight Dalvik:
• We ignore the superfluous MOVE-RESULT-PSEUDO opcode.
• The ROP actually has a variant of the CONST instruction which loads a class
specification into a register. We instead choose to directly encode class-specification
constants into any instruction that requires them.
• The SWITCH opcode is irrelevant for modeling purposes, as it can be trivially desugared
into chained conditional tests.
• Monitors are immaterial to our modeling of the Dalvik system; multi-threading is
a difficult problem for traditional flow analyses and it is outside the scope of this
work (cf. subsubsection 3.2.2.2). We therefore exclude the MONITOR-ENTER and
MONITOR-EXIT opcodes.
• Filled arrays are also immaterial to our model, though for convenience’s sake we do
allow the user to declare filled arrays as initial values. We therefore exclude the
FILLED-NEW-ARRAY and FILLED-ARRAY-DATA opcodes.
• INVOKE-DIRECT is simply used as an optimization (when the virtual method involved
can be statically identified) or for invoking native code through Java (using the JNI).
As we don’t care about optimizations and we don’t attempt to model native code
interaction, we thus treat INVOKE-DIRECT as subsumed by 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚟𝚒𝚛𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚕.
• INVOKE-INTERFACE is likewise vestigial; Dalvik uses it to indirect through an interface
when performing a virtual method call. As we don’t attempt to model Java’s
interface semantics (i.e., multiple inheritance in general), we don’t ever do interface
indirect in the model. Therefore we also treat INVOKE-INTERFACE as subsumed by
𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚟𝚒𝚛𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚕.
22
𝒞 = (𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠)
ℳ = (𝐹𝑄-𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑)
ℱ = (𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑) where all 𝑙𝑖𝑡 are transformed to 𝑣
𝒫 ⩴ ⟨𝕀, ℝ, 𝕊, ℕ, 𝔼, ℍ, ℤ, 𝕄⟩
𝕀 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 𝕀 ∣ 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⩴ . . . . ∣ (𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝑟 … ) ∣ (𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗∗ ℎ𝑟)
ℝ ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑅 ℝ where 𝑅 ⩴ (𝑟 → 𝑣)
𝕊 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑆 𝕊 where 𝑆 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑣 𝑆
ℕ ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑁 ℕ where 𝑁 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 𝑁
𝔼 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝐸 𝔼 where 𝐸 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 𝐸
ℍ = (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 → 𝑅𝑒𝑓) ∪ (𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝑅𝑒𝑓)
𝑅𝑒𝑓 ⩴ 𝑜 ∣ 𝑎
ℤ ⩴ ⟨ℎ𝑟, ℎ𝑒⟩
ℎ∗ ⩴ 𝑣 ∣ ⊥
𝕄 ⩴ 𝜀 ∣ 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄
Figure 5: Machine model for Welterweight Dalvik
We define the grammar used in our abstract machine model in Figure 5.
The Welterweight Dalvik machine model is based centrally on four elements: the class
registry (𝒞 ), the static-method registry (ℳ), the static-field registry (ℱ ), and the program
state (𝒫 ). The registries are simply maps from full specifications to their respective program
elements; they are prepopulated outside the purview of the machine’s reduction model itself,
using the information provided by the program (through the 𝑇𝑜𝑝-𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙). The 𝒫 is what is
interesting: it is the element which is transformed during a reduction rule in the model. It
is represented by a record composed of the following elements:
• An instruction stream 𝕀. It is represented as a string which is either empty, has a 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡
on top, or is the special token 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎. For the convenience of the machine model, we
add an additional two pseudo-instructions: 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 and 𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗∗.
• A register stack ℝ. We use a stack to help enforce the notion that methods—even in
the DVM (vs. the JVM)—are not supposed to communicate through the registers,
but rather using the parameter and return stacks. Thus a method is confined to using
only its set of registers. It is represented as a string which is either empty or has a 𝑅
on top. A 𝑅 is, in turn, a map from registers 𝑟 to values 𝑣.
• A nested parameter stack 𝕊. This is the stack of stacks of parameters passed to
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methods. Like ℝ, it is a stack (in this case nested) because methods are not supposed
to be able to access the parameters of an earlier caller; thus a method can only access
the parameter stack intended for it. It is represented as a string which is either empty
or has a 𝑆 on top. A 𝑆 is, in turn, the actual (non-nested) parameter stack for a
method. It too is represented as a string which is either empty or has a 𝑣 on top.
• A return stack ℕ. This is the stack of return points for method invocations. It is
represented as a string which is either empty or has a 𝑁 on top. A 𝑁 in turn is
simply the instruction stream to which to return, represented as a string which is
either empty or has a 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡 on top.
• An exception-handler stack 𝔼. This is the stack of exception-handling catch-points
for method invocations. It is represented as a string which is either empty or has a 𝐸
on top. A 𝐸 is has the same purpose as a 𝑁 and is represented identically.
• A heap ℍ. This is the heap which indirects all referential data in the program. It
is a map to referential data 𝑅𝑒𝑓 , either from addresses 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 or from full static field
specifications 𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐. A 𝑅𝑒𝑓 is simply either an object 𝑜 or an array 𝑎. Outside
the purview of the reduction model, it is prepopulated with the initial values of static
fields.
• A pair of hidden registers ℤ. It represents the odd hidden registers in the DVM ROP
machine model which are used to store a method’s return value (ℎ𝑟) or a method’s
thrown exceptional (ℎ𝑒). It is represented as a record of those two registers. A hidden
register is either full with some value 𝑣 or empty, denoted using ⊥.
• A stack trace of the call-chain of methods 𝕄. It is represented as a string which
is either empty or has a 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 on top. It is used in order to identify the current
method, e.g., for label-resolution purposes.
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2.3.2 Reduction rules
In this subsection we give the reduction rules for the machine model of Welterweight
Dalvik and summarize them in prose. If no rule matches—in particular if an instruction-
handling rule would match but one of its side-conditions if violated—then the program
reduction reaches a stuck state, indicating a semantically invalid program. In particular,
in some situations the DVM (and JVM) would throw an exceptional deriving from
RuntimeException or Error—collectively known as unchecked exceptionals. The
Welterweight Dalvik model instead treats these conditions as stuck states. Validation for
this can be found in the discussion of OOCFA2’s design choices (subsubsection 3.2.2.1).
Each reduction rule takes the form of a judgment from premises to conclusions, split by
a horizontal line. The reduction is in term of the entire program state 𝒫 , using the relation
𝒫 ↪ 𝒫 . As 𝒫 is a record, we take some notational liberty for clarity and conciseness.
Namely, the relation ↪ may be parameterized by certain machine/program elements. This
explicitly denotes that they are used but preserved during the relation, i.e., the noted
element does is not itself transformed during the relation, though it may be part of a larger
transformation. See Figure 6 for an example of the of a reduction rule and its long-form
expansion. For the sake of clarity, we also make sure to explicitly note in the premise any




𝒫 ⟨(𝑂𝑝1 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔 → 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩





𝒫 ⟨(𝑂𝑝1 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔 → 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔 → 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔, 𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩
where 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛿1(𝑂𝑝1, 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔)
(b) Long-form expansion











Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules are no-ops. The label rule exists simply so that if we reach a 𝚐𝚘𝚝𝚘, we have
a means by which to identify what point in an instruction stream to which to jump.
↪
try-catch-finally
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 ∶ (𝚝𝚛𝚢 [𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑦 …] 𝚌𝚊𝚝𝚌𝚑 [𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ …] 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕𝚕𝚢 [𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 …])𝕀′ 𝔼⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 ∶ [𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑦 … 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 …]𝕀′ ((𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ … 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 …)𝕀′)𝔼⟩
(b) Try-Catch-Finally
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
The try-catch-finaly rule is actually a syntactic convenience for Welterweight Dalvik
programs. The DVM itself does not have a notion of 𝑇𝐶𝐹 or of scope, and thus there it
is desugared into 𝚐𝚘𝚝𝚘s and manual exception-handling. In keeping with the notion of this
simply being a syntactic convenience, the model does not attempt to emulate scope and
thus, e.g., a 𝑇𝐶𝐹 statement cannot embed 𝚐𝚘𝚝𝚘s (otherwise the semantics of 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕𝚕𝚢 would
be broken). Furthermore, a 𝚌𝚊𝚝𝚌𝚑 block is responsible for rethrowing any exceptions which




𝒫 ⟨(𝚖𝚘𝚟𝚎 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ⟩
where 𝑣 = 𝑅(𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚)
↪
move-param
𝒫 ⟨(𝚖𝚘𝚟𝚎-𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊𝚖 𝑟𝑡𝑜) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ (𝑣 𝑆) 𝕊⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ 𝑆 𝕊⟩
↪
move-result
𝒫 ⟨(𝚖𝚘𝚟𝚎-𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚞𝚕𝚝 𝑟𝑡𝑜) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ ℤ⟨ℎ𝑟 ∶ 𝑣⟩⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ ℤ⟨ℎ𝑟 ∶ ⊥⟩⟩
↪
move-exception
𝒫 ⟨(𝚖𝚘𝚟𝚎-𝚎𝚡𝚌𝚎𝚙𝚝𝚒𝚘𝚗 𝑟𝑡𝑜) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ ℤ⟨ℎ𝑒 ∶ 𝑣⟩⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ ℤ⟨ℎ𝑒 ∶ ⊥⟩⟩
↪
const
𝒫 ⟨(𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚝 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑖) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖])ℝ⟩
(c) Movement
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle movement of values into registers.
• The move rule copies a value from one register 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 to another ℝ𝑡𝑜.
• The move-param rule pops a value 𝑣 from the parameter stack 𝕊 and puts it in the
destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜.
• The move-result rule moves the return value 𝑣 stored in the hidden register ℎ𝑟 into
the destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜.
• The move-exception rule does the same, but for exception values, using the hidden
register ℎ𝑒.





𝒫 ⟨(𝑂𝑝2 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔1 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔2) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔1 → 𝑣1, 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔2 → 𝑣2])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝑂𝑝1 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔 → 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝚌𝚖𝚙 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔1 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔2) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔1 → 𝑖1, 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔2 → 𝑖2])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩
where 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛿𝑐𝑚𝑝(𝑖1, 𝑖2)
↪
Conv
𝒫 ⟨(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔/𝑡𝑜) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔/𝑡𝑜 → 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔])ℝ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔/𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩
where 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛿𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑔)
(d) Operations
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle various primitive operations on integers.
• The Op2 rule performs a binary operation on the integers within registers 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔1 and
𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔2, using the metafunction 𝛿2 to perform the operation; it stores the result in the
destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜.
• The Op1 rule behaves similarly, but for unary operations using register 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔 and the
metafunction 𝛿1, which performs the operation.
• The cmp rule behaves similarly to Op2. However, it uses the metafunction 𝛿𝑐𝑚𝑝, which
compares the given integers and returns −1, 0, or 1 depending on if the first integer
is less than, equal to, or greater than the second integer, respectively.
• The Conv rule behaves similarly to Op1, but the destination register and argument
register are the same: 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔/𝑡𝑜. It also instead uses the metafunction 𝛿𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣, which





𝒫 ⟨(𝐼𝑓 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟1 → 𝑣1, 𝑟2 → 𝑣2])ℝ 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀′⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝚐𝚘𝚝𝚘 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙) 𝕀 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀′⟩
where 𝕀′ = 𝛿𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑜(𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙, 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑)
(e) Branches
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle primitive branching to 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙s.
• The If rule uses the values in argument registers 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 to evaluate whether to
branch to 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 according to the metafunction 𝛿𝑖𝑓 ; the actual instruction stream to
which to branch is found using the 𝛿𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑜 metafunction.





𝒫 ⟨(𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗 𝑟) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟 → 𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑡])ℝ⟩







𝒫 ⟨(𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗∗ ℎ𝑟) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ 𝕀′ ℕ 𝐸 𝔼 ℤ 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀′ ℝ ℕ 𝔼 ℤ ⟨ℎ𝑟⟩ 𝕄⟩
(f) Returning
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle returning from methods.
• The return rule simply transitions to a 𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗∗, using the value in the given register
𝑟 as the operand.
• The return-void rule likewise transitions to a 𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚗∗, but uses ⊥ as the operand.
• The return* rule is the actual workhorse for returning; places its operand into the
hidden register ℎ𝑟, pops off all method-scoped stacks, and returns control to the





𝒫 ⟨(𝚝𝚑𝚛𝚘𝚠 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑛) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑛 → 𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑛])ℝ ℤ⟩




𝒫 ⟨𝕀 ∶ 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎 𝑅 ℝ 𝑁 ℕ [] 𝔼 ℤ ⟨ℎ𝑟 ∶ 𝑣⟩𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄⟩




𝒫 ⟨𝕀 ∶ 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎 𝑅 ℝ 𝑁 ℕ 𝕀′ 𝔼 ℤ ⟨ℎ𝑟 ∶ 𝑣⟩ 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝕄⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀′ ℝ ℕ 𝔼 𝕄⟩
(g) Throwing/Handling
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules deal with the throwing, propagation, and handling of exceptions.
• The throw rule places the value in the given register 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑛 into the hidden register ℎ𝑒;
it then begins the process of handling the exception by setting the instruction stream
𝕀 to the special token 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎.
• The handle-propagate rule is triggered if the top of the 𝔼 is empty; in this case we
pop off all method-scoped stacks and continue to attempt to 𝚑𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚕𝚎 the exception.
• The handle rule is triggered if the top of the 𝔼 holds a proper handler; in this case




𝒫 ⟨(𝚗𝚎𝚠-𝚒𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ ℍ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤 ≔ 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑤]⟩
where 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∉ ℍ




𝒫 ⟨(𝚗𝚎𝚠-𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 → 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒]) ℝ ℍ⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤 ≔ 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑤]⟩
where 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∉ ℍ
where 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜀)
(h) Allocation
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle the raw allocation of new reference types. Note that this does not
involve initialization—i.e., an object’s class’s constructors. Constructors must be manually
emulated in Welterweight Dalvik.
• The new-instance rule allocates a new address on the heap, stores there a new object
of the given class 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐, and returns the address through the destination
register 𝑟𝑡𝑜.
• The new-array rule behaves similarly to new-instance, but stores a new array of the





𝒫 ⟨(𝚌𝚑𝚎𝚌𝚔-𝚌𝚊𝚜𝚝 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑜𝑓 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑓 ])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑓 → 𝑅𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑓 ]⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎-𝚘𝚏 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑜𝑓 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑓 ])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑓 → 𝑅𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑓 ]⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙])ℝ⟩
where 𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 =
1 if 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒?(𝑅𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑓 , 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒)
0 otherwise
(i) Casting
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle run-time type-checking.
• The check-cast rule checks if the object referenced through 𝑟𝑜𝑓 is an instance of the
given reference type 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, using the 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒? metafunction; if it isn’t, the program
enters a stuck state.
• The instance-of rule does the same as check-case, but returns an interger-encoded





𝒫 ⟨(𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢-𝚕𝚎𝚗 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 _ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 _)]⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝚊𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 → 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠)]⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ⟩
given 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 < 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
where 𝑣 = 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠(𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) if 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∈ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 otherwise
where 𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 =
0 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒




𝒫 ⟨(𝚊𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 → 𝑣, 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 → 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 → 𝑎]⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 ≔ 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑤]⟩





𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∧ 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒?(ℍ(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚)
𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑖 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
where (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠) = 𝑎
where 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚢 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠[𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 → 𝑣])
(j) Array operations
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle array operations.
• The array-len rule returns through the destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜 the size 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 of the
array referenced through 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟.
• The aget rule returns through the destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜 the element at the index
given by the value in register 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 of the array referenced through 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟. If the index
is out of the bounds of the array’s 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, then the program enters a stuck state. If
the index in question has not been assigned in the array, then a default value is used,
according to the semantics of the DVM.
34
• The aput rule assigns the index given by the value in register 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 of the array
referenced through 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟 to the value in register 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚. If the index is out of the bounds
of the array’s 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, then the program enters a stuck state. If the value being put does






𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 → (𝚘𝚋𝚓 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠)]⟩
𝒫 ⟨𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑡𝑜 ≔ 𝑣])ℝ⟩
where 𝑣 = 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠(𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) if 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 ∈ 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 otherwise




𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 → 𝑣, 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 → 𝑜]⟩





𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∧ 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒?(ℍ(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑)
𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑖 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
where (𝚏𝚒𝚎𝚕𝚍 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 _ _ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 _) = 𝛿𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑(𝒞(𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐), 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
where (𝚘𝚋𝚓 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠) = 𝑜
where 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝚘𝚋𝚓 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠[𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝑣])
(k) Instance operations
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle instance operations.
• The iget rule returns through the destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜 the value that the object
referenced through 𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 has for its field given by 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐. If the object doesn’t have
a value for that field, then the default for that field is used, given its definition found
using the metafunction 𝛿𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 .
• The iput rule assigns the field given by 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 of the object referenced through
𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗 to the value in register 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚. If the value being put does not conform to the field’s





𝒫 ⟨(𝚜𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) 𝕀 𝑅 ℝ ℍ[𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 → 𝑣]⟩




𝒫 ⟨(𝚜𝚙𝚞𝚝 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 → 𝑣])ℝ ℍ⟩





𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∧ 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒?(ℍ(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑)
𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑖 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
where (𝚏𝚒𝚎𝚕𝚍 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 _ _ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 _) = ℱ(𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
(l) Static operations
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
These rules handle static field operations.
• The sget rule returns through the destination register 𝑟𝑡𝑜 the value of the static field
given by 𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐.
• The sput rule assigns the field given by 𝐹𝑄-𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 to the value in register 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚.
If the value being put does not conform to the field’s type given by 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 , then the





𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚟𝚒𝚛𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚕 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … ) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 → 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠]⟩
𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠… … ) 𝕀⟩
given 𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 ∉ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …]
where (𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚑𝚘𝚍 _ _ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …] _ _ _ … ) = 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
where 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 = 𝛿𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑(𝒞(𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐), 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)




𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚜𝚞𝚙𝚎𝚛 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … ) 𝕀
(𝑅[𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠])ℝ ℍ[𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 → 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠]⟩
𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠… … ) 𝕀⟩
given 𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 ∉ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …]
where (𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚑𝚘𝚍 _ _ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …] _ _ _ … ) = 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
where 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 = 𝛿𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑(𝒞(𝐹𝑄-𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟), 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)
where (𝚌𝚕𝚊𝚜𝚜 _ _ _ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟 _ _) = 𝒞(𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐)




𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎-𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … ) 𝕀⟩
𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠… … ) 𝕀⟩
given 𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚌 ∈ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …]
where (𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚑𝚘𝚍 _ _ [𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 …] _ _ _ … ) = 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑




𝒫 ⟨(𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … ) 𝕀 (𝑅[𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … → 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 …])ℝ 𝕊 ℕ 𝔼 𝕄⟩





𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∧ 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒?(ℍ(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚)
𝚗𝚞𝚕𝚕 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑓-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑖 if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚-𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
for 𝑣 ∈ [𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 …], 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ∈ [𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 …]
where (𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚑𝚘𝚍 _ _ _ [𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 …] _ 𝑆𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 …) = 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
(m) Method invocation
Figure 7: Welterweight Dalvik reduction rules
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These rules handle method invocation.
• The invoke-virtual rule transitions to an 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎, using the instance method 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
identified by the metafunction 𝛿𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 , using the class 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 given by looking up in the
class registry 𝒞 the 𝐹𝑄-𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 of the object referenced through 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠. If 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
is declared to be static, then the program enters a stuck state.
• The invoke-super rule behaves as in invoke-virtual, but uses 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠’s superclass for
the method lookup.
• The invoke-static rule also transitions to an 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚔𝚎, using the static method 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
given by looking up in the method registry ℳ the given 𝐹𝑄-𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑-𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐. If 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑
is not declared to be static, then the program enters a stuck state.
• The invoke rule is the actual workhorse of invocation. It pushes new frames onto
all method-scoped stacks, in particular pushing the values in the argument registers
𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 … onto the 𝕊, the remaining instruction stream 𝕀 onto the ℕ, and the invoked
method 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 onto the 𝕄. It jumps to 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑’s body by setting the instruction
stream. If any of the argument values do not conform to 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑’s corresponding





This chapter describes the OOCFA2 algorithm and the structures behind it in detail.
In section 3.1 we discuss the structuring and implementation of the value space for both
the conceptual version and implementation of the OOCFA2 algorithm. In section 3.2 we
discuss the algorithm itself, present it in pseudocode, and provide miscellaneous notes and
caveats and limitations regarding the algorithm. In section 3.3 we discuss what we consider
to be the most noteworthy extensions that our algorithm provides on top of more traditional
flow analyses and abstract interpretations. Finally, in section 3.4 we provide an empirical
evaluation of the algorithm’s implementation and discuss the results.
As a very general description of the algorithm, consider once again that it is an abstract
interpretation of the DVM ROP. Thus, we work with a model of Java’s run-time, including
an abstract heap, stack, registers, static fields, and all supporting infrastructure such as the
class registry. During the interpretation, we keep track of the set of possible concrete values
an abstract value can take. We could also have no idea what the possible concrete values of
an abstract value could be (e.g., if it is input), and so we consider it unknown (though we
do have some idea of its type). Using these abstract values, we mimic the ROP instructions
on our abstracted state. If we come to a point where, given multiple or unknown concrete
values, there are multiple possible control flows, we explore them all, using a different set of
abstract states for each. We avoid exploring the same abstract state twice by keeping track
of those we’ve visited and remembering their outcomes; this is termed summarization and
is crucial to the tractability of our algorithm. We also include some heuristics (section 3.3)
to prevent infinite (or too much) looping in the abstract interpretation, even if the abstract
states are distinct.
We have implemented our algorithm in the Scala programming language [28]. This is a
language which is compatible with Java and runs on the JVM. As such, our implementation
is idiosyncratically designed to “reflect” or “lift” the Java type system into itself, as seen
from Scala. We explain this design in subsection 3.1.1.
We now give a brief overview of type theory and related terminology which we use or
introduce. In a type-theoretic sense, types categorize values and kinds are types of types.
In order to generalize these two concepts, we introduce the notion of a variety: types are
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varieties of values and kinds are varieties of types. A dependent variety is a variety
which depends upon that over which it varies, e.g., a dependent type depends on values. A
singleton variety is a dependent variety which denotes a set consisting of a single thing
over which it varies, often aliased with itself, e.g., the integer 0 can be thought of as typed
by the singleton type of 0 (itself kinded by, e.g., 𝑁𝑎𝑡). We use Guy Steele’s recently-coined
terminology of ilk [3] as the definition of the “run-time type” of a value. In his phrasing,
“expressions have types; values have ilks”. Finally, Java has two instantiable classes of
Throwable (which denotes values which can participate in exception-handling): Error and
Exception. We collectively refer to values of either of these classes as exceptionals.
3.1 Value Space
At a high-level view, environments map variables (vars) to abstract values (𝑣𝑎𝑙s). In
turn, 𝑣𝑎𝑙s represent sets of possible concrete values (vals) or an unknown value (⊤).
A trace environment is used for intra-function, inter-basic-block variables, which are
register variables.
A static environment is used for inter-function, static fields, which in Java semantics
are attached to a particular class and not its instances. These fields are denoted by static
variables.
An instance environment is used for the association between the instance-field slots of
the ilk of an (Object -derived) instance, denoted by field variables, and the values for that
instance’s fields. In this way, every “object” is an environment in and of itself, mirroring
the semantics of object-orientation.
Finally, a heap environment is used for tracking the values on the abstract heap
according to their abstract heap address, denoted by heap variables.
Each concrete value is annotated upon creation with the abstract values it depends
upon. For example, when performing an addition, the resulting value is noted as dependent
upon the operands to the addition instruction. This is important for proper handling of
looping/recursion (subsection 3.3.1), besides being useful for a variety of analyses layered
























Figure 8: The implementation of OOCFA2’s value-space, with respect to Java types
3.1.1 Implementation
The implementation of the value space is modeled after the typing relations of the Java type
system, which Dalvik inherits. In Figure 8, we give a diagram of a highlighted portion of the
value space (incomplete and eliding many details) to help visualize the following discussion.
In the Java type system, ilks are given by first-class entities called classes. Notably,
this includes even the primitive, non-referential types, such as integers; they too have ilks
defined by classes, though the association between the two is only emulated by the system;
they have no direct tie to their ilk’s “class”. We model ilks as instances (in the Java sense)
of Java (Scala) classes, which we use to model kinds. In turn, values of a particular class 𝐶
are modeled as instances of 𝐶’s particular Value inner-class; more specifically as instances
of its Unknown inner-class should the values be unknown or as instances of its Instance
inner-class if the value is known. In this manner, we “lower” the Java type system one
43
“level”, such that we can in a more intuitive manner emulate the type-driven operations of
the language.
In Figure 8, arrows denote object-oriented inheritance, encapsulation denotes inner-
classing, and blocks of a darker color denote singleton classes. Green blocks denote “kind-
classes” (or types as well, if they are singleton kinds), red blocks denote “value-classes”,
and blue blocks denote “reference-classes”.
At the top-level, there is Type, encompassing the entire system. There are quite a few
sub-kinds of Type which exist in the system, but of particular note is the Instantiable
sub-kind. It denotes the kind of all types which represent values which can exist at run-time
(e.g., not the Void type). It first defines the inner-classes of Value, Unknown, Instance,
and Array. As Scala does not support “virtual inner classes”, sub-kinds are contractually
(forced by the type system) obligated to have their own versions of those inner-classes
extend their super-kind’s versions, should they “override” (redefine, really) them.
Though the other inner-classes were previously discussed, Array was not; it is actually
a singleton kind. It cannot be extended (thus a singleton kind effectively doubling as a
type) and is, intuitively, the type of arrays of its enclosing type. It is dependent in that it
depends on the specific type of its parent kind (the instance of its parent class). In normal
circumstances, one would express this by making Array a type which is parameterized over
the type of its elements, but as types are first-class instances, this would operate on the
wrong level (indeed, requiring dependent types). Instead, we emulate a dependent kind in
the Java-standard way: using an inner-class.
Of note, Array is actually a sub-kind of Reference Type. The latter denotes the kind
of all types which are reference types in the Java system. Notably, this includes not only
Java’s “top” Object type and all of its classes, but also Array as mentioned and the special
Null singleton kind. The latter exists because the Dalvik system provides a type-descriptor
for values which are known to be null. Reference types’ Instances themselves include one
more layer of inner-classing: the Ref type. These represent the type of references to the
particular concrete value (instance of Instance) in question, again emulating a dependent
type with an inner-class.
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Finally, Object is the singleton kind representing the Object class at the top of the
traditional Java class hierarchy. Its Instance type provides the analysis’ modeling of
instance fields, their environments, their inheritance and overriding behavior, etc.
A class 𝐶 which has been seen during analysis (either because it was mentioned in the
type of an object or method, or because 𝐶 itself is being analyzed) is modeled by creating
an instance of the Object kind, and thus 𝐶 is a value representing a type. Note that as all
of the primitive types are built into the analysis, the only possible “novel” types that can
be encountered during analysis must be reference types; and as array-types are constructed
from their element types and the pseudo-type Null is inextensible, this leaves Object as
the only possible super-kind/type for the newly-constructed type in question.
Using reflection-hackery and dependency-injection on the JVM, it would also be possible
to dynamically create a Java class to represent 𝐶 and make it extend the Object type. This
is actually what is done (in a hard-coded manner instead of a reflective one) for the analysis’
built-in, common types (e.g., String and Exception). However, it would be of little practical
benefit given that the machinery works as-is and that, as Scala does not (and may never)
support “virtual inner classes”, the inner Value-derived classes would have to be manually
extended from their super-kind versions, and thus the burden and level of hackery is too
great to validate this scheme.
3.2 Algorithm
A high-level overview of the implementation’s algorithm is as follows:
1. We analyze each accessible method (including “main”) – that is, public or protected
in a non-final class – with an unknown static environment (or the initial static
environment if analyzing “main”).
2. To analyze a method, we abstractly interpret over its basic blocks.
3. To interpret a basic block, we evaluate each of its instructions in sequence,
accumulating changes to the static environment, heap, register-file, etc.
4. If we encounter a method call, then we set up to call it (e.g., pushing parameters
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on the stack) and jump to analyzing it in this new context, assuming it hasn’t been
summarized.
5. If the basic block ends in an unconditional branch, we simply begin interpreting the
following basic block.
6. If the basic block ends with a return, then we update the summary of the method we
have been interpreting and return back to the calling context in our analysis.
7. If the basic block ends with a conditional, we check to see if we statically know the
outcome of the conditional operation and if so only interpret the basic block along
the arm of the branches (plural in the case of a switch statement) which are possible.
Either way, we propagate conditional-dependent information along the corresponding
arms.
The pseudocode in Figure 9 gives a more detailed view of the implementation’s
algorithm. Note that we use a few conventions in these figures:
• We use the ⟅⊸⟆ notation to denote a multiset
• Some function calls are double-underlined. This is to indicate that, in actuality, this
function is defined in the scope of the underlined call; it is effectively “inlined”. Thus,
e.g., all variables visible in such a scope are also visible in the function’s definition, as
long as they are not shadowed by, e.g., the function’s parameters.
• Some function calls are single-underlined. This is a visual reminder that the function
being called is defined within this scope’s parent function.
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1 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ← options provided by user
2 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒-𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 ← all accessible methods in compilation unit
3 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡-ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣 ← initial environments, e.g., after class initialization
4 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∶ {Method ↦ FIndex ↦ FSummary}
← ∅
5 𝑓-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∶ {FTrace ↦ FEffect}
← ∅
6 for 𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 ← 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒-𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠
7 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ← ∅
8 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 ∶ {Method ↦ FTrace ↦ Phase}
← ∅
9 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛-𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 ← array of unknown instances of each parameter’s declared type
10 trace-method(𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑, 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡-ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛-𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
(a) Pseudocode for the top level of OOCFA2
Figure 9: OOCFA2 pseudocode
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trace-method(𝑚, 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
1 append 𝑚 to 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒
2 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ← 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 relative to 𝑚
3 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 ← judge phase from 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 using ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒
4 match 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒
5 case NONE ∨ INIT ⇒ do nothing
6 case STEP ⇒
7 insert 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣) into 𝑓-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑚]
8 case CLEANUP ⇒
9 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ← 𝑓-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑚][ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒]
10 induce unknowns in (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣) relative to 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
11 insert 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣)
into 𝑓-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑚]
// done case is impossible
12 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒] ← advance-phase(𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛-𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)
13 𝑓-𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ← (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
14 if ∃𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∶ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠[𝑚][𝑓-𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥]
15 return 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦
16 else
17 𝑏𝑏-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∶ {BBTrace ↦ BBEffect}
← ∅
18 𝑏𝑏-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 ∶ {BB ↦ BBTrace ↦ Phase}
← ∅
19 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ← ∅
20 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ← ∅
21 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠 ← ∅
22 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣 ← ∅
23 trace-bb(𝑚.𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒, 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣)
24 return 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠[𝑚][𝑓-𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥]
(b) Pseudocode for the trace-method function, defined within the top-level
Figure 9: OOCFA2 pseudocode
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trace-bb(𝑏𝑏, 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣)
1 append 𝑏𝑏 to 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒
// Note that 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 here is an alias for the operation’s sink register in 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣
2 for 𝑖𝑛𝑠 ∈ 𝑏𝑏.𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 match 𝑖𝑛𝑠.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
3 case NOP ⇒ do nothing
4 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Evaluable ⇒
5 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← evaluate according to 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 using 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠
6 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Move ⇒
7 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← take from 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 or 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, depending upon 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒
8 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ GET-FIELD ⇒
9 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← specified field from 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
10 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ GET-STATIC ⇒
11 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← specified field from 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣
12 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ PUT-FIELD ⇒
13 set specified field in 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[1]] using 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
14 update 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣
15 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ PUT-STATIC ⇒
16 set specified field in 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣 using 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
17 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ A-GET ⇒
18 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← value in index 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[1]]
of array 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
19 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ A-PUT ⇒
20 put 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[2]] in index 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[1]]
of array 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
21 update 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣
22 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Monitor ⇒
23 set monitored status of 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]
24 update 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣
25 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ NEW-INSTANCE ⇒
26 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← create a new instance of the specified class
27 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ (NEW-ARRAY ∨ FILLED-NEW-ARRAY) ⇒
28 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← create a new array (possibly filled) with elements of the specified class
29 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ CHECK-CAST ⇒
30 𝑜𝑏𝑗 ← 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
31 if 𝑜𝑏𝑗 might not satisfy the specified type
32 add the appropriate ClassCastException to 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠
33 if 𝑜𝑏𝑗 must satisfy the specified type
34 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← 𝑜𝑏𝑗 operating at the specified type
35 elseif 𝑜𝑏𝑗 might satisfy the specified type
36 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← an unknown instance of the specified type
37 elseif 𝑜𝑏𝑗 does not satisfy the specified type
38 follow-paths(calculate-catchers(𝑜𝑝))
39 finalize-trace-bb
40 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ CONST ⇒
41 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← extracted constant from 𝑜𝑝
42 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ ARRAY-LENGTH ⇒
43 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← length of array given by 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]
44 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Call ⇒ handle-call
45 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Branch ⇒ handle-branch
(c) Pseudocode for the trace-bb procedure, defined within trace-method
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1 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 ← extracted parameters from 𝑜𝑝
2 if 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 ≠ INVOKE-STATIC
3 prepend “this” object (extracted from 𝑜𝑝) to 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
4 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒-𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠 ← method resolved from 𝑜𝑝 according to its 𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒
and “this” object’s ilk, if applicable
5 for 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒-𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠
6 if 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is unknown
7 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒-𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 ← unknown value of the return type and
any possible exception thrown from the signature
8 eval-summary(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒-𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦)
9 else
10 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡-ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ← 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 relative to 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
11 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 ← judge phase from 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 using 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡-ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟
12 if 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 = DONE
13 handle 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 as if it were unknown
14 else eval-summary(trace-method(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑓-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑓-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠))
(d) Pseudocode for the handle-call procedure, separated from trace-bb
Figure 9: OOCFA2 pseudocode
eval-summary(𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦)
1 update 𝑟𝑒𝑡-𝑣𝑎𝑙 in 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 using 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦
2 update 𝑒𝑥𝑛-𝑣𝑎𝑙 in 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 using 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦
3 update 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠 using 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦
(e) Pseudocode for the eval-summary procedure, defined within handle-call
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1 if 𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠.𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 1
// Special hotpath for unambiguous succession; also subsumes GOTO
2 if 𝑜𝑝 may end
3 handle-end
4 trace-bb(𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠.ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑, 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣)
5 return




10 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ← 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 relative to 𝑏𝑏
11 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 ← judge phase from 𝑏𝑏-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 using ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒
12 match 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒
13 case NONE ∨ INIT ⇒ do nothing
14 case STEP ⇒
15 insert 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠)
into 𝑏𝑏-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑏𝑏]
16 case CLEANUP ⇒
17 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ← 𝑏𝑏-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑏𝑏][ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒]
18 induce unknowns in (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠)
relative to 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
19 insert 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠)
into 𝑏𝑏-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠[𝑏𝑏]
20 case DONE ⇒ return // Done cleaning up loop
21 𝑏𝑏-𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠[𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟] ← advance-phase(𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠.𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)
22 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ← calculate-catchers(𝑜𝑝) ∪ calculate-reachable-successors(𝑜𝑝)
23 if 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ≠ ∅
24 follow-paths(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ)
25 else finalize-trace-bb
(f) Pseudocode for the handle-branch procedure, separated from trace-bb
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1 match 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒
2 case RETURN ⇒
3 if 𝑜𝑝.𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠.𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 0
4 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ← VOID
5 else
6 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ← 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣[𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0]]
7 insert 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 into 𝑓-𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠[𝑚][𝑓-𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥].𝑟𝑒𝑡-𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠
8 case THROW ⇒
9 add 𝑜𝑝.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠[0] to 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠
(g) Pseudocode for the handle-end procedure, defined within handle-branch
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51
follow-paths(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠)
1 for (𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑏𝑏-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) ∈ 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠
2 locally update (𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣)
using 𝑏𝑏-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
3 trace-bb(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒′, 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠′, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐-𝑒𝑛𝑣′, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝-𝑒𝑛𝑣′, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑣′)
(h) Pseudocode for the follow-paths procedure
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1 insert (𝑏𝑏-𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 ↦ 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠 into 𝑓-𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠[𝑚][𝑓-𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥].𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠
2 return
// Note that since this procedure is inlined, this returns from the enclosing function
(i) Pseudocode for the finalize-trace-bb procedure
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calculate-catchers(𝑜𝑝)
1 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∶ ⟅BB ⊸ BranchPatch⟆
← ∅
2 for 𝑡 ∈ 𝑜𝑝.𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ-𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
3 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 ← 𝑏𝑏.ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠-𝑓𝑜𝑟(𝑡)
4 for 𝑒𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠
5 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ← 𝑡 > 𝑒𝑥𝑛.𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
6 if 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ≠ ⊥
7 for ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟 ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠
8 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ← ⟨𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙-𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒.𝑒𝑥𝑛-𝑣𝑎𝑙 ← 𝑒𝑥𝑛
remove 𝑒𝑥𝑛 from 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠 ⟩
9 insert ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟 ↦ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ-𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ into 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠
10 if 𝑡𝑟𝑖 = ⊤
11 remove 𝑒𝑥𝑛 from 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡-𝑒𝑥𝑛𝑠
12 return 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠
(j) Pseudocode for the calculate-catchers function
Figure 9: OOCFA2 pseudocode
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calculate-reachable-succesors(𝑜𝑝)
1 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ∶ ⟅BB ⊸ BranchPatch⟆
← ∅
2 match 𝑜𝑝
3 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ If ⇒
4 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ← evaluation of 𝑜𝑝’s conditional with its operands
5 if 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ≅ ⊤
6 insert 𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠[0] ↦ ⟨ conditional-/path-specific knowledge ⟩ into 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ
7 if 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ≅ ⊥
8 insert 𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠[1] ↦ ⟨ conditional-/path-specific knowledge ⟩ into 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ
9 case 𝑜𝑝 ∶ Switch ⇒
10 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠 ← { evaluate 𝑜𝑝’s conditional with its operand and 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∣ 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∈ 𝑜𝑝}
11 if ∃! 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠, 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ∈ 𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 ∣ 𝑡𝑟𝑖 = ⊤, 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ⊧ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟
12 insert 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ↦ ⟨ conditional-/path-specific knowledge ⟩ into 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ
13 else for 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠 ∣ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ∈ 𝑏𝑏.𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠
14 if 𝑡𝑟𝑖 ≅ ⊤
15 insert 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ↦ ⟨ conditional-/path-specific knowledge ⟩ into 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ
16 return 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ
(k) Pseudocode for the calculate-reachable-successors function
Figure 9: OOCFA2 pseudocode
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3.2.1 Miscellany
As the implementation runs on the JVM, we take advantage of this fact and use the JVM’s
reflection abilities to “lift” certain pure methods into the analysis-proper, given that they
operate on known (non-bottom) abstract values. For example, we use this ability to append
strings together and perform certain static string methods; this allows us to perfectly
accurately analyze common string behavior, whereas we wouldn’t be able to do so were
we to have to treat the Java API as a black-box. In particular, this string example is very
useful with respect to Android because so many of its API-provided facilities rely on string
parameters for, e.g., identification. One example of this is how one identifies intents by
using their string name.
3.2.2 Caveats & Limitations
In the implementation, we have made a few – what we believe to be – relatively benign
simplifying assumptions, besides the fact that the analysis is subject to some inherent
limitations.
3.2.2.1 Unchecked exceptionals
The analysis assumes that unchecked exceptionals (Errors or RuntimeExceptions) would
only be caught inside of the method in which they could occur. Therefore, if they aren’t
caught, then they would never be and the program would terminate anyway, thus there is
no harm in erasing them should they not be caught. Furthermore, Sun (now Oracle) has—
since Java’s inception—explicitly recommended against catching unchecked exceptionals in
application code [21], regarding it not only as bad practice, but as leading to potentially
undefined behavior.
3.2.2.2 Multi-threading
The analysis does not handle multi-threading; it is outside the scope of this work. Our
analysis assumes that during our abstract interpretation, the only way that variables can
be changed is via the interpretation’s single abstract thread of control. It would be bad
form and antithetical to the “Android way” [11] to mutate shared global state between two
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threads of control anyway, not to mention that this is a difficult and ongoing problem in
the field of abstract analysis.
3.2.2.3 Whole-application view
The analysis assumes that it is given a view of an entire Android application in this
compilation unit. This means that everything it is analyzing will be executed in its own
singular VM at run-time, and thus the analysis doesn’t have to worry about certain kinds
of interference, such as static variables being assigned outside its purview. Therefore, it can
reasonably guarantee the points by which the world interfaces with the analyzed code.
3.2.2.4 Reflection
Though noted in official Google documentation as an unsupported means of application
programming, Java-provided reflection facilities are used by certain applications. Legitimate
applications often make use of reflection to, e.g., deserialize JSON and XML, invoke private
or otherwise hidden Android API methods, and abstract over API classes whose names
changed between versions. [9] Of course, reflection is a common means of evading static
analysis and is especially used in many malicious and black-market applications. The
algorithm does not currently deal with reflection, but it should in principle not be too
difficult to do so (subsubsection 6.1.2.1).
3.2.2.5 Java Native Interface
As the analysis operates on ROP, it obviously cannot analyze past the JNI (“Java Native
Interface”)—the boundary between the JVM/DVM and native code. Though ostensibly we
could extend the analysis to analyze native code, this would be a tremendous and difficult
undertaking, given the much more “open” semantics and environment surrounding native
code.
3.2.2.6 Android-ignorance
The analysis does not currently encode any heuristics or knowledge of the Android
environment. It only reasons over the DVM (in the form of ROP) and its semantics.
Most Android development actually only nominally (in a sense) uses the Java language
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and APIs. Instead, development is very Android-specific, using all sorts of Android-specific
tools, frameworks, infrastructure, and metadata. As a result, Android applications typically
have the following list of attributes:
• They are very “horizontal” in the sense that they do not create large amounts of
deep structure for their own use, but rather provide a broad set of relatively shallow
components which hook into the broad Android APIs and system appropriately.
• Following from the above point, they are very callback-oriented, in that the manner
in which and points by which they hook into the Android APIs tend to be callbacks,
event handlers, or asynchronous updates.
• Following from the above point, they are “implicitly” multi-threaded. Each thread
is a separate, concurrent task which often behaves like an “actor” in the actor-model
sense; it communicates with other actors in a structured manner and does far more
computation on its own than involving communication.
As one example of a useful Android-specific heuristic, currently the implementation of
OOCFA2 uses a very simple heuristic for deciding which methods are externally accessible
and thus possible starting points for the analysis. It chooses all accessible methods according
to the definition of the standard Java ecosystem: public methods or protected methods
whose classes are non-final. This is a gross over-approximation of the Android system.
Android applications do not directly link and live entirely in their own VM; thus these
“accessible” methods cannot actually be accessed by external code. Rather, the starting
points for an Android application are the methods which the APIs will use as callbacks.
Reasoning over the Android system—in this manner and others—is left for future work
(subsection 6.1.2).
3.3 Flow-analysis Extensions
The following sections describe extensions to standard flow-analysis practices which are
novel to the best of our knowledge.
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3.3.1 Loop and recursion exploration
In order to guard against possibly infinite or undesirably large looping or recursion (hereafter
interchangeably referred to as “looping”), we introduce a two new concepts: header traces
and loop phasing.
A header trace is, relative to some current basic block 𝑏𝑏, the sub-range of the current
trace from the last time 𝑏𝑏 was encountered until the current point in the trace. It is used
to identify looping by considering the header trace to be an iteration of a loop.
Each time the algorithm encounters an iteration of a loop – detected by passing though a
previously-passed basic-block – the loop’s phase (more accurately the header trace’s phase)
is advanced in the abstract interpretation. There are five phases in this scheme:
• none: The loop has not been entered yet.
• init: The loop has just been entered.
• step: The loop has iterated for a certain number of times. This is configurable akin
(but not equivalent) to the traditional notion of “fuel ”; the default is zero units of
fuel, which equates to the step phase only consisting of a single iteration.
• cleanup: After all iterations in the step phase, cleanup is performed as discussed below.
• done: The analysis is done exploring this loop and thus should not continue to do so
along this path of abstract interpretation.
Note that the notion of fuel used in OOCFA2 in the step phase differs importantly
from the more traditional notion. Fuel in normal abstract-interpretation parlance describes
the number of “steps” allowed to be taken in a potentially infinite looping or recursive
interpretation before the analysis “gives up” and falls back to a far less precise (but still
sound) result before moving on. In a similar spirit, OOCFA2’s “fuel” reflects the number of
step phases allowed; it basically reflects the number of times we’ve seen the particular loop
(head trace) we’re phasing over. However, it is important to note that an increase in fuel
in OOCFA2 could easily lead to an exponential increase in the exploration of the analysis.
This is due to the fact that each possible nondeterministic path abstractly interpreted past
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the loop will be fully explored (and paths resulting from those paths, ad infinitum) until
each path individually reaches the done phase of the loop in question.
The real trick to the precision of this approach (while preserving soundness) versus
the typical fuel-driven approach involves the cleanup phase. When it is entered, the
analysis examines the current register-file and heap and compares it to the last environment
remembered for the particular header trace in question. For each abstract value which was
created after two or more iterations of the loop, it is judged that the value is loop-varying
and thus made ⊤ (it is dropped). Furthermore, every abstract value which depends in some
way upon a dropped value is itself also dropped. In this manner, the algorithm ensures that
any abstract values which varied with the loop are noted as unknown, because it cannot
know how many times the loop could have executed, or even if that number of times was
finite. The cleanup phase then proceeds, during which the unknown values are propagated
through one iteration of the loop, in order to preserve soundness. Once the analysis has
reached another iteration of the loop, it enters the “done” phase and ceases iterating.
3.3.2 Semantic aliasing
Semantic aliasing is a solution to the problem of undesirably disjoint environments.
Consider the example given in Figure 10. In it, we have four basic blocks, 𝐴 through
𝐷. There is the allocation of some object 𝑜 in 𝐷 and some number of unnamed allocations
in A. When abstractly interpreting this structure, we may follow the path 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐷 or the
path 𝐴 → 𝐶 → 𝐷. Now, let us assume (without loss of generality) that we have implemented
abstract heap addressing and allocation via, e.g., a global counter, such that each allocation
is guaranteed a different address throughout the entire abstract interpretation. If we were
to follow the 𝐴 → 𝐵 path, 𝑜 will be allocated some address 𝑎. If instead we follow the
𝐴 → 𝐶 path, 𝑜 will be allocated some other address 𝑎′ due to the intervening allocations in
𝐶.
The problem lies in the fact that the user of the analysis – let us assume also the
writer of the code being analyzed – clearly expects 𝑜 to be a single, “traceable” object






Figure 10: Semantic-aliasing basic-block example
nondeterministic abstraction, exploring all possible paths, yielding different abstract heap
addresses for 𝑜 depending upon the path taken. Thus, if the user were to query the results
of the analysis with, e.g., “what is are the possible outcomes of this function” (something
common in, e.g., information flow analysis [subsubsection 6.1.3.1]), the union of the possible
environments coming out of the function would include 𝑎 and 𝑎′ pointing to two versions
of 𝑜, whereas the desired result would be a single 𝑎 pointing to an abstract value denoting
the two possibilities of 𝑜. (Better yet, the field environments of the two versions should
be joined such that we see a single 𝑜 with, e.g., an abstract value of two possibilities for
some differing field 𝑓 .) Thus, the algorithm should induce the semantic aliasing of the two
possible 𝑜s to a single heap address.
Note that the situation gets more complicated in the presence of loops (structured or
otherwise), such as the hypothetical loop between 𝐷 and 𝐴. In this case, the user does not
expect 𝑜 to represent a single conceptual “run-time object”, but rather understands that, at
run-time, the allocation instruction will allocate a new 𝑜 for each time it is executed. Thus,
semantic aliasing in this case is undesirable because it would impose aliasing on objects
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which are deterministically distinct at run-time.
Our solution is that we address allocations to the abstract heap via a tuple of the
instruction which induced the allocation and the trace of basic-blocks taken to get there.
In this way, we have the information we require to properly evaluate – post-hoc – whether
this is a semantic alias with respect to another allocation involving the same instruction,
but along a different path. This is left to happen post-hoc and on-demand for the following
reasons:
• The analysis is built in such a way that it does not use a worklist (at least not in
the sense of CFA2 [25]), and thus abstractly interprets using the analysis’ runtime
stack. (This was inspired by jsCFA [24].) Because of this, the analysis does not join
environments with other abstract traces of execution, given that, short of the set of
function summaries, there is no cumulative record of environments to join.
• Future work involving loop-aware semantic aliasing (subsubsection 6.1.1.1) allows
for different, dynamic, non-uniform notions of semantic aliasing and thus joining
the environments immediately according to the notions described here would be
inappropriate.
3.4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we give a preliminary evaluation of the accuracy of the OOCFA2
implementation. We also provide some performance data, though this is not particularly
enlightening other than giving some reassurance that the analysis is not particularly “heavy”.
3.4.1 Caveats
There are two important caveats to keep in mind when reviewing this data. First of all, there
are no actually “comparable” analyses with which to compare OOCFA2, so these results are
essentially offered in a vacuum. One issue is that—as stated in the discussion of this work’s
contributions (section 1.4)—this is the first analysis of its kind on Dalvik. Therefore no
other approaches use a similar methodology (even as general as “abstract interpretation”)
and thus metrics or even just the intrepretation of them do not compare well between
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approaches. Another issue is that—especially for performance data—it would simply be
irresponsible to compare two approaches in, e.g., two different languages (never mind using
different implementations) and expect the results to somehow convey information on the
performance of one algorithm compared to another, versus simply the implementations.
The other caveat is regarding the benchmarks themselves. We have searched as much
as we could, but we failed to uncover any “industry-standard” benchmarks which did not
fall prey to at least one of the following problems:
• Most Java benchmarking suites feature a benchmarking framework and tooling
infrastructure. This is nearly always using the reflective capabilities of the JVM
in order to, e.g., dynamically load and invoke benchmarks. As we cannot (yet
[subsubsection 6.1.2.1]) reason over JVM reflection—especially when it involves
dynamically loading code—we cannot reason over the actual benchmarks themselves.
If the dynamically loaded benchmark code is not otherwise patched (which, again,
some benchmarks do), then we can instead manually add the code for analysis, given
a local copy.
• Many Java benchmarks heavily depend on the input of some file. By “heavily
depend”, we mean that the intended nature of the benchmark and the metrics resulting
from that nature are either entirely dependent upon the input or otherwise largely
dependent. An example of this would be a benchmark whose configuration is set up
through an XML file or a Jython [1] (Python running on the JVM) benchmark which
interprets a Python file. A notable counterexample would be a typical FFT (“Fast
Fourier Transform”) benchmark. While its output obviously strongly depends upon
its input, the nature of that output and the metrics which can be gleaned from the
benchmark are largely independent of the actual data given; e.g., random input data
would be about as informative as any other random input data with respect to the
intent of the benchmark. Given such benchmarks—though we can safely and soundly
abstract, e.g., the side-effecting operations of reading a file into unknown values—
our abstract interpretation would not represent the “spirit” of the benchmark and its
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algorithms terribly well.
• Most Java benchmarks are multi-threaded. Even if they can be single-threaded,
they are written to cope with multi-threading. Thus, e.g., an integer taken from
the command line is taken to be the number of threads with which to run. As we
cannot abstractly determine this integer, we would end up with a situation where
we either have to model an arbitrary number of threads or enforce single-threaded
semantics on code expecting multi-threaded semantics. (For example the code could
use work-queues for runnable subtasks; which we would end up understanding to be
possibly arbitrary code running in possibly nondeterministic order.) Given that our
algorithm does not attempt to reason over multiple threads (subsubsection 3.2.2.2),
we would at best be misrepresenting the nature of the benchmark again.
3.4.2 Metrics
There are three primary metrics that we use to evaluate the accuracy of our algorithm.
Though there are of course many ways we could attempt to measure this—simple numerical
metrics or otherwise—we have chosen these metrics because they can convey an intuitive
notion of “accuracy” very simply and directly vis-à-vis object-oriented code.
The first is the notion of ilk accuracy. This measures how accurate our algorithm
is at resolving what the possible ilks of an abstract value are. This is important for a
variety of reasons, but for the purposes of our evaluation (and arguably the most important
reason in general) it particularly matters for virtual-method resolution. According to Java
(and general OOP semantics), when a virtual method is called, the actual method which
is called depends on the object it is being called upon; more specifically, its ilk. In this
way, a subclass may “override” methods defined by its superclass—provided they are not
final, in Java terms—assured that any of its instances will be directed to use the overridden
version instead of the original one. Therefore upon attempting to abstractly resolve a virtual
method call we take note of which and how many possible ilks an abstract value may take,
using that as a metric.
The second is the derived notion of virtual-method resolution accuracy. Depending
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on the ilks which were resolved from the abstract value in question, there may be multiple
methods to which we could dispatch. Of course, several of these ilks may resolve the virtual
method to the same actual method. However, even if the ilk can be narrowed to simply one
possibility, the value itself may be unknown, and thus we cannot assume that the concrete
value that this abstract value represents is actually of this exact ilk and not a subclass,
which could potentially have overridden the method. Thankfully, this complication can be
averted if it is known that the virtual method in question is final or that the ilk is final; there
would then be no possibility of overriding. Thus we take note of the number of possible
method resolutions we can make given a virtual method call and the ilks involved.
The final metric is that of basic-block transition accuracy. Depending on the result
of a conditional test or a multi-way branch, there can be multiple possible successors to a
basic block. Depending on how accurately the algorithm can track the possible concrete
values an abstract value can take, it can more or less accurately determine which of those
transitions is possible—which of those successors is reachable along that abstract path—
and which are not. We take note of this information at each conditional and use that for
this metric. Specifically, for conditionals which are binary (i.e., if-tests) we note whether
one path can be entirely pruned or not. We could very well have noted how many of the
possible concrete values involved could be valid along each path, but that would make for
a much more complicated metric for what we feel to be little gain for the purposes of this
experiment. The number of multi-way branches in these tests is so minimal that we exclude
them from this discussions.
In terms of performance metrics, we simply note the average run time and the average
memory usage of the implementation over five executions.
3.4.3 Tests
DaCapo consists of a set of open source, real world applications with non-trivial memory
loads. It is widely considered the “gold-standard” of Java benchmarking, and thus we use
it as one of our test programs.
MATSim provides a framework to implement large-scale agent-based transport
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simulations. The framework consists of severel modules which can be combined or used
stand-alone. To get a better understanding under which circumstances MATSim performs
best, its creators created a simple benchmark that runs 20 iterations of a sample scenario
with different settings. We include this benchmark as one of our test programs.
Each test program was analyzed in two runs: one main-method-focused and
one accessible-method-focused. For main-method-focused tests, only the executable-
accessible methods of the program are taken to be starting points for analysis—i.e.,
the standard Java “main method” having the signature public static void/int
main(String[]). Accessible-method-focused tests instead consider all of the programs
“accessible” methods, from an API point-of-view. This set includes all public methods and
all protected methods of a non-final class. (Though technically using JVM reflection one
can invoke even the private methods of a class, we ignore this case for obvious reasons, one
of which is that it flies in the face of the conventional expectation of Java’s semantics.)
Each of these tests was run with the implementation’s full debugging enabled in order to
allow verification of the results (resulting in, e.g., 657 MB of gzip-compressed debug output).
This shouldn’t have any real effect on the accuracy of the memory usage metrics, but it does
slow the execution and so adversely affects the average run time. Scala version 2.10.0-RC5
was used on Oracle’s JVM version 7.10, along with the following JVM options: -ea -Xmx4g
-Xss2m -XX:+UseThreadPriorities -XX:+UseCompressedOops -XX:+DoEscapeAnalysis
3.4.4 Results
3.4.4.1 Ilk accuracy
Something which cannot be seen in the summarized data (Table 1a) is the nature of the
possible ilks represented. In actuality, an interesting situation occurred: the only situations
in which the algorithm resolved more than one ilk involved exceptionals. All of these
exceptionals stemmed from exception-handling. This reflects the semantics of Java; whereas
a method can only have one return type, it can throw any number of exception types, and
not necessarily even through an explicit “throw”. Thus, while the algorithm can precisely
track the ilk of the return value of a method, it can easily conflate the possible ilks of
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Table 1: OOCFA2 accuracy results
(a) Ilk accuracy: For each test, we show the number of virtual-method calls which were resolved to
a certain number of ilks
# Ilks
Tests 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
DaCapo (main) 9150 19 131 794 117 — 88 — 1270 3491 — — — — — —
DaCapo (accessible) 185795 56 234 808 162 8 250 8 1270 4693 9 — — — — —
MATSim (main) 1568 85 10 8 — 42 12 24 4 4 4 4 66 34 24 10
MATSim (accessible) 34335 126 84 86 637 464 200 2966 4 4 4 4 66 34 24 10
(b) Virtual-method resolution accuracy: For each test, we show the number of virtual-method calls







(c) Basic-block transition accuracy: For each test, we show the number of basic-block transitions
which had two successors, then which ones were considered to have a certain number of reachable
successors, then which ones resulted in a certain number of taken branches
# Successors # Reachable # Branched
Tests 2 1 2 0 1 2
DaCapo (main) 6380 93 6287 — 283 6097
DaCapo (accessible) 153018 81781 71237 315 82833 69871
MATSim (main) 125 7 118 — 8 117
MATSim (accessible) 35324 1341 33983 228 1635 33508
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the exceptionals which may be uncaught by a method. (Exceptionals which are explicitly
thrown by a method are tracked as precisely as normal return values.)
Even in the face of such conflation, the percentage of ilks that are resolved to exactly
one is quite high: 61% for DaCapo (main), 96% for DaCapo (accessible), 83% for MATSim
(main), and 88% for MATSim (accessible). Of course, in terms of non-exceptionals (i.e., the
values that sincerely matter with regard to the benchmarks themselves), this percentage is
100% in all tests.
3.4.4.2 Virtual-method resolution accuracy
As curiously shown in the data (Table 1b), all virtual method invocations were precisely
resolved for all tests. In reviewing the raw data, we believe that this is sincerely not in
error. Let us review the situations for which a virtual method invocation can be precisely
resolved:
1. The ilk is precisely resolved and the concrete value in question is known
2. The ilk is precisely resolved and the concrete value is unknown, but the virtual method
in question is final, either itself or by proxy of its defining class being final.
3. The ilk has multiple possibilities, but they share the resolved implementation of the
invoked virtual method (either because it is final or because none of the ilks overrides
it).
Every single case of virtual-method resolution encountered in the tests fits one of those
three conditions. It is likely that part of the fortune here is that these benchmarks—and
benchmarks in general—tend not to stress virtual method resolution a great deal. Indeed,
for performance reasons, they often attempt to avoid virtual methods which are difficult to
statically determine.
3.4.4.3 Basic-block transition accuracy
The data in Table 1c shows that in most cases our algorithm was not able to completely
eliminate one of the branches in a conditional. This is not entirely surprising, as it only
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takes one unknown value (or—statistically—a large enough set of known values) to require
both branches of the conditional to be explored due to possibility. Of note, the accessible-
method-focused DaCapo test yielded a very large proportion of one-sided branches—larger
than the remaining uncertain conditional branches. Upon examination of the debugging
logs, it seems that this is because many of the accessible entry-points to DaCapo were
shallow and involved object-equality comparisons. As they involve objects as arguments,
these equality comparisons tend to involve far fewer possible concrete values and furthermore
far fewer unknown values.
3.4.4.4 Performance
The most remarkable performance result (Table 2) is the amount of memory used during
the accessible-method-focused tests, especially versus the main-method-focused tests. We
can therefore conclude that the amount of memory used by the analysis is most affected by
the number of starting points that it uses. This can be explained by remembering that—in
order to soundly support (among other uses) the loop/recursion exploration scheme—the
algorithm keeps track of the dependencies between abstract values. Thus essentially all
abstract values remain strongly referenced during the analysis and so cannot be garbage-
collected. Why this matters vis-à-vis a starting point is that a given chain of abstract values
can share much ancestry given that its abstract interpretation started at the same point.
Given a different starting point, a different “root” of the abstract value dependency graph
is given and thus an entirely new space of memory is used. Even if an abstract value itself
may still be canonically equivalent to another from another dependency graph (another
starting point), due to our representation, they are two separate objects in the JVM. We
believe this to be the largest factor in how much memory the analysis uses. We confirmed
this suspicion through the examination of the JVM’s profile of its heap space during the
analysis’s execution.
Perhaps with a programmatic notion of semantic aliasing (subsection 3.3.2), we could
make it such that these dependency graphs were not entirely disjoint and an abstract value’s
identity could be tied to this notion, thus hopefully greatly reducing the number of actual
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Table 2: OOCFA2 performance results
Test Memory (MB) Run time (M:S)
DaCapo (main) 353 0:36
DaCapo (accessible) 2490 3:52
MATSim (main) 577 2:00
MATSim (accessible) 3940 5:21
abstract values in-use.
Something else to notice in the performance data is that memory usage and run time do
not necessarily correlate with the breadth of paths explored (as seen in Table 1c). Indeed,
even though the MATSim tests featured far less breadth in paths explored than with
DaCapo, they ran for longer and used more memory. Of course, this shouldn’t be very
surprising considering that all sorts of other factors could influence the performance far
more than mere path-breadth: number of starting points (as discussed above); path-depth;
complex manipulation of large, trackable state; etc. In this case, it is actually a factor of
MATSim having more starting points and, moreover, doing much more array manipulation





This chapter describes the proof-of-concept Android security implementation. Bear in
mind that it really is merely proof-of-concept, and thus restricted in scope and practical
utility. In section 4.1 we describe the intuitions behind and the structuring of our
permissions-analysis. Then in section 4.2 we provide an empirical evaluation of our
permissions-analysis and discuss the results.
4.1 Permissions-checking scheme
Android’s access control policies and permissions-using APIs are extremely under-documented.
As such, it is nearly impossible for developers or researchers to surmise what permissions an
application might require in order to function properly, short of actually testing the code in
various scenarios. Worse, as previously discussed (subsubsection 1.3.1.2), the permissions
and checking mechanisms are themselves ad-hoc, and so they cannot be automatically
identified in the implementation code. This is also aside from the fact that many parts of
the Android APIs are implemented in native code, exporting a Java shim, and thus the
variety of unstructured means by which permissions could be checked is significantly larger,
given the relative “freedom” of native code.
This all means that even crossing the technical hurdles of the permission-checking
implementation—made significantly easier and more powerful through the use of OOCFA2—
the largest hurdle remains in the form of statically identifying permissions-requiring API
invocations at all. This is largely a case of needing the Android APIs to be suitably
annotated with their permissions requirements. Even though this is a herculean task
in and of itself, it is made more difficult given that some permission-requirements are
non-trivial expressions. For example, the java.lang.Runtime.exec method accepts a
String which is the system command to perform. An application requires the DUMP
permission if attempting to invoke “dumpsys” or “dumpstate”. Alternatively, it requires
the INSTALL_PACKAGES permission if attempting to invoke “pm install”. Thus, not
only must all of the APIs be essentially manually annotated with the required permissions
(something which should have best been done during development), an expressive and usable
scheme of expressing possibly complex permissions must be developed and used.
70
4.1.1 Stowaway project
The Stowaway [9] [2] project is a static analysis tool and permissions map for identifying
permission use in Android applications. The researchers behind the project needed to build
a permissions map of the Android APIs, which we have used as a primary source in lieu
of attempting to manually annotate the APIs ourselves. In order to build this permissions
map, the researchers had to go through many hurdles to dynamically and in a relatively
black-box manner discover which API uses required which permissions in which situations.
[9, subsection 3.1]
4.1.2 Caveats
The Stowaway project’s permissions map and our use of it does not come without caveats.
Of note, their permissions map only applies to Android 2.2, though most of the
information is likely applicable to later versions. As verifying its later applicability in
detail would require me essentially recreating their arduous testing process again, it would
void the point of using their work and thus we have judged such concerns immaterial to the
case study.
Furthermore, the format in which they present their data is relatively unstructured.
In particular, they have not devised a structured means of expressing anything beyond
simple, unconditional permissions-requirements. They include a “Note” column in the data,
where they describe in prose any additional, conditional, or otherwise complex permissions-
requirements for the API usage on that line. As this is presented in prose, we have elected to
ignore any permissions listings which include a note, instead of attempting to encode some
logic to reason over some of the provided prose. This is not too concerning as relatively few
entries in the permissions map include notes (58 out of 1292). I have also taken the liberty
of manually encoding some of the more complex permissions-usage conditionals directly into
the analysis, as a proof of concept. (One such complex conditional is the previously used
java.lang.Runtime.exec example.)
As previously discussed (subsubsection 3.2.2.6), OOCFA2 (and by proxy, this security
analysis) does not currently encode any heuristics or knowledge of the Android environment.
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In particular, neither analysis reasons over Intents [15]. The majority of the notes involve
permissions checks which depend upon the Intent being used, reflecting the previously-noted
dynamic and horizontal structuring and behavior of and between Android applications and
the Android APIs.
Finally, also as previously noted (subsubsection 3.2.2.4), OOCFA2 does not currently
reason over Java’s run-time reflection mechanisms. As this is both a typical means of
subverting static security analysis and not uncommon in Android-development practice,




To test our application’s ability to accurately detect permissions violations, we had it
analyze several “malicious” applications we prepared. As OOCFA2 is implemented in terms
of the dx tool (subsection 2.1.1), it currently requires JVM bytecode for the application one
wishes to analyze. As the more traditional malware we would have wished to investigate is
only available as already-translated DVM bytecode, this meant that we would be unable to
analyze any of them. Thus we took a variety of sample applications from the Android SDK
and made them malicious, subversive, or otherwise in misuse of permissions. We introduced
such permissions violations as in our java.lang.Runtime.exec example.
The kinds of code we introduced for the permissions-violating method call were one or
a combination of each of the following:
1. A plain, unadorned call in the normal flow of the code’s execution
2. A call embedded within a conditional. These situations include:
(a) An always-false conditional
(b) A conditional whose branch depends on guaranteed-known values in the code
(c) A conditional whose branch depends on unknown values in the code (e.g., inputs)
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3. A call embedded in the static initialization of a class (whose initialization-time may
be nondeterministic)
4. A permissions-violation which depends upon the value of one of the arguments to the
method call. These situations include:
(a) An always-known argument (e.g., a literal string)
(b) An argument which depends upon guaranteed-known values in the code (e.g., a
string composed of appending other literal strings)
(c) An argument which depends upon unknown values in the code (e.g., a string
input from the user)
4.2.2 Results
Following the same overall ordering as in our introduction of the kinds of code we used to
test our application’s permissions-violating capabilities, here we describe the results:
1. Plain, unadorned calls in the normal flow of the code’s execution had no adverse affect
on our ability to detect permissions violations.
2. Regarding calls embedded within a conditional:
(a) Always-false conditionals were correctly never explored, and thus any permissions
violations within the conditionals were ignored.
(b) Conditionals depending upon guaranteed-known values yielded permissions-
violations detection as one would expect:
i. If all the known-value possibilities indicated the conditional would always be
taken, our application concluded that there was a guaranteed permissions-
violation.
ii. If only some of the known-value possibilities indicated the conditional would
be taken, our application concluded that there was a possible permissions-
violation.
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iii. If none of the known-value possibilities indicated the conditional would be
taken, our application dutifully ignored any permissions-violations within
the conditional’s branch, as it did not explore the branch.
(c) Conditionals depending on unknown values would result in our analysis reporting
that there was a possible permissions-violation.
3. A call embedded in the static initialization of a class resulted in permission-violations
detection largely as one would expect:
(a) If the class was never referred-to in the code, then its class-initialization code
would never be executed and thus the permissions-violation would never occur.
(b) If the class is referred-to at some point in the code, then its class-initialization
code may be executed at various points in time, leading to a possible permissions-
violation.
(c) If the class is furthermore guaranteed to be referred-to in the code, then along
all paths its class-initialization code will be executed. However, in this case
our application reports a possible permissions-violation instead of a guaranteed
one. It does not retroactively examine all the possible paths which lead to
the permissions-violation; it instead merely notes the nondeterministic nature of
the class initialization and judges the permissions-violation as merely “possible”
should it occur. Keep in mind that OOCFA2 in general is not structured to keep
track of all the intermediate states it has explored (unlike, e.g., CFA2), and thus
there would be no reasonable way to achieve this required retrospective power.
4. Argument-dependent permissions-violations also resulted in detection as one would
expect:
(a) For always-known arguments, the application either reports that the permissions-
violation is guaranteed or impossible, depending upon whether the arguments
lead to a violation or not. If there are a mix of possible concrete values for these
arguments, some which violate the permission and some which don’t, then the
74
permissions-violation is merely possible.
(b) The same result comes of arguments which depend upon always-known values,
assuming that OOCFA2 can reason over the function used on the values. An
example where it can would be string appending; an example where it can’t
(currently) would be arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic.
(c) If an unknown argument is involved, the application must be conservative and
report the permissions-violation as possible.
Combining all of these factors, our application would only ultimately report a
“guaranteed” permissions-violation if all the proper factors were in place and the control
path leading up to the violation did not involve any unknown values, i.e., it was absolutely
certain that upon any “normal” execution of this application, there would be a permissions-
violation. Likewise, our application would ultimately report a “possible” permissions-
violation if this would be guaranteed if not for unknown values influencing the flow of
control. It would report an “uncertain” permissions-violation if any of the factors considered
the permissions-violation to be “possible” (it is impossible for any to report “impossible”
unless all do). Finally, it would report an “impossible” permissions-violation if all of the
factors considered the permissions-violation to be “impossible”—regardless of whether the






In this section we discuss the related work leading up to OOCFA2. We assume some degree
of understanding of abstract-interpretation.
5.1.1 k-CFA
The k-CFA [22] family of algorithms were introduced by Shivers. They are phrased to
operate upon higher-order functional programs, whereas OOCFA2 takes an object-oriented
stance. These algorithms approximate the valid control-flow paths through the program
as the set of all paths through a finite graph of abstract machine states, where each
state represents a program point plus some amount of abstracted environment and control
context.
However, the set of paths through a finite graph is a regular language, whereas the
execution traces produced by recursive function calls are strings in a context-free language.
Therefore the use of k-CFA on programs including recursive function calls permits execution
paths which do not properly match calls with returns. This is particularly dangerous
behavior in a higher-order functional setting, as functional values flowing down these
spurious paths can lead to further “phantom” control-flow structures, along which functional
values can then flow, and so on and so forth; this whole process then sharply decreases the
precision of the analysis and likewise (by the logic used in section 1.2) leads to a sharp
increase in the cost of the analysis.
5.1.2 CFA2
In order to remedy the problems of call/return matching problems of k-CFA, Vardoulakis
and Shivers introduced CFA2 [25]. This algorithm uses a pushdown model of abstract
interpretation which can accurately resolve the call/return matching problems which arise
out of k-CFA’s regular-language-based modeling.
OOCFA2 is largely CFA2 as applied to an object-oriented environment, with some
extensions (section 3.3) and, in terms of its primary implementation, tailored to Java’s
and the DVM’s semantics. Notably unlike CFA2, our algorithm doesn’t need to deal with
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first-class control (or anything other than escape-continuations), and thus we don’t use this
machinery from CFA2 [26].
5.2 Android security
In this section we discuss some of the state-of-the-art alternatives and solutions to Android
security, as proposed in the literature and implemented.
ScanDal [16] is a sound and automatic static analyzer for detecting privacy leaks in
Android applications. Like OOCFA2, it too is an abstract interpretation. However, it works
over the DOP instead of the ROP and is a first-order analysis instead of a higher-order one.
It is an information-flow analysis which determines if there exists any flow of data from a
sensitive source through a sensitive sink. As discussed in subsubsection 6.1.3.1, we have
the ability to do the same and plan to do so in future work. Furthermore, their analysis
is much more tailored to Android, with Android-specific abstract-interpretation including
callbacks and event-handling. This, too, is something with which we hope to extend our
analysis (subsubsection 6.1.2.2). Nevertheless, our analysis is fundamentally more precise
and powerful, thus we expect it to perform much better than ScanDal once it is specifically
tailored to Android.
TaintDroid [7] monitors Android applications at run-time, sacrificing run-time per-
formance for the ability to track how applications leak private information. Thus, it is a
dynamic solution, in contrast to our static solution. We feel that its 14% CPU overhead
is inappropriate for an embedded environment, and that a purely static approach is a
better fit. Of course, it is also possible for the approaches to complement each other; if
OOCFA2-based security analyses indicate that the application is safe, then it can be run
without the overhead of TaintDroid—otherwise we could use TaintDroid to still allow the
statically-unsafe execution of the application.
Enck et al. [8] used decompiling techniques, some automated tools, and manual
inspections to determine the safety of Android applications. They studied 1100 popular
free Android applications, showing that they often misuse users’ private data. As for
their decompilation, they designed and implemented a DOP-to-Java-source decompiler,
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then analyzing the Java source. However, they failed to recover about 5% of the classes
in the applications they analyzed. As our solution does not depend on decompilation, we





In this work we’ve introduced the OOCFA2 algorithm, an implementation of it, and
a proof-of-concept security-oriented application of it. We’ve also introduced a formal
semantics for Dalvik’s ROP.
This is the first PDA-based higher-order flow analysis in an object-oriented setting.
With respect to the modeling of the Dalvik virtual machine, this is the first application
of a higher-order flow analysis to an assembly language. We discussed the algorithm in
chapter 3 and in particular our novel extensions to flow-analysis in section 3.3.
This work also features the first (published) formal model of the Dalvik virtual machine
and its semantics. As far as we are aware, it is also most definitely the first formal model
targeting Dalvik’s ROP (cf. section 2.1 and section 2.2). We discussed this model—named
Welterweight Dalvik—in section 2.3.
The Android-security-focused proof-of-concept application also is the first (published
example) of its kind. We discussed this application in chapter 4. The use of a such a
powerful higher-order flow analysis allows one to apply its knowledge to create a wide variety
of powerful and practical security-analysis “front-ends”—not only the permissions-checking
analysis in this work, but also, e.g., information-flow analyses (subsubsection 6.1.3.1).
We empirically evaluate OOCFA2’s accuracy and performance (section 3.4) to prove its
practical viability. We also evaluated the proof-of-concept security analysis’ accuracy as
directly related to OOCFA2 (section 4.2); this shows promising results for the potential of
building security-oriented “front-ends” atop OOCFA2.
6.1 Future work
6.1.1 Flow analysis
6.1.1.1 Loop-indexed semantic aliasing
As discussed in subsection 3.3.2, semantic aliasing is an invaluable concept for any consumer
of the output of OOCFA2 to make use of its state-space representations. This utility
can be further extended by, e.g., discovering structured loops and identifying a set of
otherwise-undesirable semantic aliases as related across an iteration of such a loop. The
truly interesting point comes when considering nested loops; each level of nesting would
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equate to an “axis” in the iteration-space, with each alias noted at its respective point
in this iteration-space. At first pass, this would allow a user of the analysis to see the
“progression” of an aliased value along one of the axes as the difference between the value
along the iteration. They could also selectively “compress” an axis (or multiple) in the
space for some aliased valued, forcing all such aliases to be considered one semantic alias
representing all of the possible values the alias could be with respect to a loop. We are
uncertain of the particular uses of the ability to view the data in this manner, but it
certainly seems to be potentially quite useful.
6.1.2 Android ecosystem
6.1.2.1 Reflection-reasoning
Since we have an essentially whole-system view of the APIs and application, we can
abstractly interpret the string-based reflection methods as reflecting upon our own
“database” of classes, methods, and fields.
The analysis currently supports and encourages the loading of external java archives,
which are injected into the analysis’ JVM and introspected-upon. This is used to, e.g.,
load the Android standard libraries and introspect upon them, allowing for the more
precise identification of classes, methods, and fields used in the analyzed program. Should
a reflective method be encountered, this large space of introspection—along with the
introspection built from the analyzed code itself—could be consulted to satisfy (or at least
refine the possible outcomes of) the reflected method.
6.1.2.2 Android-specific heuristics
As previously discussed (in subsubsection 3.2.2.6), the analysis does not currently encode
any heuristics or knowledge of the Android environment. Some particular highlights of
Android-ignorance include:








• Android-specific metadata [12], such as AIDL and the “AndroidManifest.xml” file
• Application resources [13]
• Common Android development practices
In particular, the lack of reasoning over the Intents system and its Intents, Activities,
Content Providers, and bound services is the most pressing issue in this regard. The system
is relatively well-documented with plentiful metadata describing each component’s behavior
and requirements. There are also Android system-provided services with guaranteed
behavior and standard Intents which would be very valuable to reason over.
6.1.3 Further security uses
6.1.3.1 Information-flow analyses
An information-flow analysis involves analyzing the data dependencies in a program
and asserting that no information-flow violations occur, wherein a producer of sensitive
information (a source) somehow provides data to an illegitimate consumer of said sensitive
information (a sink).
As discussed in subsection 3.3.1, OOCFA2 currently tracks the dependencies between
values during an abstract interpretation, in order to properly implement the cleanup phase
of the loop-phasing technique. This corresponds cleanly to the interests of an information
flow analysis; OOCFA2 even tracks the control dependencies between values, not just the
data dependencies. The machinery which exists is so perfect for this use that one should
be able to write a simple information-flow security analysis front-end to OOCFA2, which
is simply aware of what the sources, sinks, and types of information of interest are in an
Android setting (or alternatively be able to dynamically identify sources and sinks). This
is left for future work.
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